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INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the Eastern District of Pennsylvaniajoined several other
federal districts when it decided to engage in a two-year pilot program
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of using multiple source lists as
a means of improving minority representation in the jury selection
process.' Currently, sixteen federal districts (including the Eastern
1
See Government Exhibit 1 at 7, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (No. 95-10) (discussing the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's plans to begin supplementing its jury source list).
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District of Pennsylvania) select jurors from source lists that supplement voter registration lists with lists of licensed drivers. 2 Adding to
this group the District of Massachusetts, 3 which employs a supplemental residents list, there are presently seventeen districts in nine circuits
that use multiple source lists when selecting potential jurors. In each
case, the district chose to supplement its source list to increase minority representation and to further the policies of the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968. 4 But, does supplementation really work?
2 SeeAffidavit of David Williams, Senior Programs Specialist, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts at 2, United States v. Ramsey, No. CRIMA98-131 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(identifying the following thirteen districts that supplement voter registration lists with lists
of licensed drivers: the Northern District of California, the District of Colorado, the District of Columbia, the District of Hawaii, the Central District of Illinois, the Eastern District
of Michigan, the Western District of Michigan, the District of New Hampshire, the District
of New Jersey, the Eastern District of New York, the Northern District of New York, the
Middle District of Tennessee, and the Northern District of Texas). Two additional districts
not mentioned by Mr. Williams supplement in the same fashion. See U.S. District Court,
District of Connecticut, Second Restated Plan for Random Selection of Grand and Petit
Jurors, at 3 (certified Nov. 28, 1992); U.S. District Court, Western District of NewYork, Jury
Plan, at 2 (certified May 23, 1994); and the sources accompanying infra note 4.
3 The District of Massachusetts selects potential jurors from a residents list compiled
annually pursuant to state statute, rather than voter registration lists, as permitted by federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (2) (1994). Because the list of state residents is the
functional equivalent of a state census, "the coverage of the resident list in 1982 was nearly
100% when compared to the 1980 census." See G. Thomas Munsterman &Janice T. Munsterman, The Searchfor Juy Representativeness, 11 Jus-r. Sys. J. 59, 66 (1986). In theory, a
census list which is intended to count every citizen in the state is the most comprehensive
source list available.
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. (1994). See U.S. District Court, Northern District of New
York, Jury Plan, at 3 (certified Aug. 1994) (stating that although voter registration lists
represent a fair cross section of the community, an even greater number of citizens will be
eligible forjury service if supplemental source lists are used); U.S. District Court, Western
District of New York, Jury Plan, supranote 2, at 2; U.S. District Court, Northern District of
Texas, Jury Plan, at 4 (certified Mar. 16, 1993) (stating that although voter registration lists
represent a "fair cross-section of the community," supplementation will foster the statutory
policies of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62); U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, Second Restated Plan for Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 3 (certified Nov. 23, 1992)
(same); U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, General Order No. 6, Plan for
the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 3 (certifiedJuly 21, 1992) (stating the
reason for choosing to supplement voter registration lists was to further foster the goals of
the Jury Service and Selection Act); U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Jury
Selection Plan, at 3 (certified Apr. 29, 1992) (same); U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Modified Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 2 (certified Aug.
15, 1991) (stating that while voter registration lists represent a "fair cross-section of the
community," using driver's license lists will allow an even greater number of citizens to be
eligible for jury service); U.S. District Court, Western District of Michigan, Plan for the
Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 2-3 (certified May 22, 1991) (finding that
either voter lists or combined lists represent a "fair cross-section of the community); U.S.
District Court, District of Colorado, Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit
Jurors, at 2-3 (certified Aug. 17, 1989) (stating that although voter registration lists represent a "fair cross-section of the community," supplementation will foster the statutory policies of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62); U.S. District Court, District of Hawaii, Plan for the Random
Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 2 (certified Jan. 1, 1989) (finding it "necessary" to
use driver's license lists to "fully implement the policy and protect the rights secured by 28
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In theory, multiple source lists increase the likelihood that the
jury selected will mirror a cross-section of the community. 5 This is
not, however, always true in practice. Statistics from several federal
districts that have been using multiple source lists for a substantial
period of time reveal that supplementation does not necessarily increase minority representation. 6 As the data in Part II demonstrate,
supplementing voter registration lists with lists of licensed drivers does
not always solve the problem of minority underrepresentation in the
7
pool of potential jurors.
Not only is supplementation ineffective, but it is also quite costly.
An increased administrative burden accompanies the process of combining source lists.8 To satisfy fairness concerns, jury administrators
U.S.C. 1861-62 [sic]"); U.S. District Court, District of New Hampshire, Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 4 (certified Dec. 21, 1988) (stating the purpose
for choosing to supplement voter registration lists); U.S. District Court, Middle District of
Tennessee, Administrative Order No. 79, Procedure for Filling the MasterJury Wheel, at 1
(certified Oct. 19, 1988) (stating a desire to insure greater participation of all segments of
the population in the jury system); U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois, Plan for
the Random Selection ofJurors, at 2 (certifiedJan. 15, 1987) (finding that the combined
lists represent a "fair cross-section of the community"); U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of New York, Jury Selection Plan, at § 4 (stating that although voter registration lists represent a "fair cross-section of the community," using driver's license lists will allow an even
greater number of citizens to be eligible for jury service).
5 See Munsterman, supra note 3, at 60 ("The higher the percentage of the total population found on the list, the more likely that a random selection from it should yield prospective jurors representative of the entire population."); David Kairys et al., Jury
Representativeness: A Mandatefor Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L REv. 776 (1977) (arguing
for the use of multiple source lists to improve minority representation).
6 See the statistical evidence and discussion infra Part lI.B. When this Note refers to
minority underrepresentation, it refers to the underrepresentation of African-Americans
and Hispanics on the source lists from which juries are selected. Admittedly, there are
other minority groups whose distinct points of view are important to recognize and whose
rights to participate in the jury process must also be protected. Yet, because the federal
court system tracks only these two groups and most of the available data pertains to African-Americans and Hispanics, the conclusions of this Note are most relevant to these two
groups. Moreover, this Note is only concerned with underrepresentation on jury source
lists. The Sixth Amendment simply obligates the government to draw ajury from a pool
that fairly represents the community; it does not guarantee that thejury itself will be fairly
representative. Several factors beyond the government's control impact the ultimate jury
and the membership of the qualified jury pool. See infra note 17.
7 Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky cite a 1975 study which found that public assistance
and unemployment lists contain a higher percentage of minorities and argue that these
are the lists that should be used to improve minority representation in the jury selection
process. See Kairys, supra note 5, at 826 n.246. Although this claim appears a priori true,
these lists suffer from some of the same defects that prevent driver's license lists from
solving the problem of minority underrepresentation. See discussion infra Part MIl.The
data were simply not available to empirically evaluate whether any of these proposed
source lists would be sufficient to cure the problem of underrepresentation. However, if
these source lists work, they represent another potential solution.
8
See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, FACETS OF THE JURY SyTEM: A SURVEY 1,
13 (1976) (labeling the use of multiple source lists "desirable," but "expensive"). But see
Kairys, supranote 5, at 819-25 (suggesting more efficient procedures for removing duplicates and arguing that the cost is insignificant). In addition to the administrative cost of
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must remove duplicate names, often by the manual process of comparing various non-computerized lists. 9 Districts aware of this additional burden require administrators to eliminate duplicates only to
the extent technically and economically feasible. 10 Yet, even though
supplementation does not achieve its intended result and imposes this
additional administrative burden, districts continue to choose supplementation as the sole means of improving minority representation."
The lack of a single test or clear numeric standard by which to
measure underrepresentation further complicates the issue.' 2 The
Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in all but the most
extreme cases challenging the composition ofjuries.13 Consequently,
no uniform standard has emerged from the case law, making it difficult to determine when supplementation is required. This, in turn,
makes it possible for courts to hide behind a presumption that voter
registration lists are a constitutionally valid source of potential jurors.
The lack of a uniform standard allows courts to permit seemingly unreasonable underrepresentations to persist and effectively denies mi14
nority defendants their Sixth Amendment rights.
After examining the effectiveness of supplementation at increasing minority representation, this Note will argue that courts should
pursue three less costly and more effective approaches to remedying
the underrepresentation problem: (1) modifying the jury questionnaire; (2) mandating that questionnaires be returned and completed;
and (3) employing stratified sampling techniques. Although none of
combining the lists and removing duplicates, using supplemental source lists embody a
second, hidden cost. A study done by the Northern District of Illinois when it was considering supplementing its source list with driver's license lists revealed that the yield rate
(how manyjury questionnaires must be mailed out for each name placed on the qualified
wheel) was higher with voter registration lists than with driver's license lists. These percentages have practical consequences, as the processing of each questionnaire entails a
cost. Thus, the larger number of questionnaires that need to be mailed using driver's
license lists makes it more costly to operate the jury system. See Ted C. Newman, FairCross
Sections and Good Intentions: Representation in FederalJuries,Report for the Northern District
of Illinois, at 20 (June 6, 1995) (on file with the author).
9 See Walter P. Gerwin, The Juy Selection and Servie Act of 1968; Implementation in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 20 MERcER L. REv. 349, 383 (1969) (citing the problem of
removing duplicates as one of the primary reasons that supplementation is viewed as impractical); Munsterman, supra note 3, at 66 (discussing the administration problems of
using lists which include corporations like tax, property, utility, and vehicle registration
lists).
10 See, e.g., U.S. District Court, Western District of NewYork,Jury Plan, supranote 2, at
2 ("A system will be developed, before any selection procedures begin, to eliminate as
reasonably as possible such duplications"); U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, Plan
for the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, supra note 4, at 3 (same).
11 See supra notes 1-2.
12
See discussion infra Part I.C.
13 See discussion infra Part I.C.
14 See discussion infra Part I.D.
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these approaches is without its problems, each warrants consideration
as an alternative to supplementing jury source lists.
Part I of this Note outlines the statutory and constitutional requirements for jury selection and examines their application in the
context of choosing a jury source list. The empirical evidence
presented in Part II refutes the claim, commonly made, that supplemental source lists improve minority representation in the jury selection process. Finally, Part III explores alternative means for achieving
greater minority representation.
I
BACKGROUND

The U.S. Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants "the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."15 The right to
ajury chosen from a "fair cross-section of the community" is a fundamental element of this guarantee. 16 Unfortunately, without rigorous
procedures to ensure fairness in the jury selection process, the process
is susceptible to abuse at many points. 17 Potential jurors may be excluded for discriminatory purposes, may not be selected at random,
or, more fundamentally, the source list from which potential jurors

15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("We accept the fair-cross-section
requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are
convinced the requirement has solid foundation."); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 227 (1946) ("Trial by jury presupposes ajury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community.... ").
17 A general overview of the typical jury selection process may be helpful for a fuller
understanding of this Note. Because it is not necessary to ask every citizen to serve on a
jury, most federal districts begin the jury selection process by creating a "master jury
wheel." Names are chosen at random from a "source list," which is often a voter registration list, and are placed on the "master jury wheel." This list of names is the master list of
potential jurors. Next, the district begins the process of quaifyingjurors. Potentialjurors
are chosen again at random from the "master jury list" and are sent jury questionnaires.
Potential jurors are asked to respond to questions about age, citizenship, and other qualifying factors, as well as to indicate their race and ethnicity. These questionnaires are usually
sent to a potential juror a second and a third time if the potential juror fails to respond to
the first mailing of the questionnaire. When the district receives the returned questionnaire, potential jurors meeting the legal requirements for jury service are placed in the
"qualified jury pool." This is the group of individuals who are actually eligible to serve on
juries. As jurors are needed, names are selected at random, and summons are mailed to
potential jurors. On the appointed day, those individuals receiving summonses are expected to report to court where they may be impaneled on a jury. See generally FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, HANDBOOK ONJURY USE IN THE FEDERAL DismraCr COURTS (Jody George et

al. eds., 1989) (outlining the jury selection process and highlighting the basic legal requirements for each step).
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are selected may not be representative of the community.18 It is this
last abuse that is the subject of this Note.
A.

The Jury Selection and Service Act

In 1968, Congress enacted the Jury Service and Selection Act (the
"Act") to standardize the jury selection procedures used in federal
courts' 9 and to ensure that the procedures used would guarantee that
the "fair cross-section requirement" was satisfied.2 0 In short, the Act
was intended to eliminate purposeful discrimination and to promote
minority representation on juries. 2 ' Congress sought to enforce these
policies by imposing strict requirements of randomness at each stage
in the jury selection process 22 and by mandating that each district's
jury selection plan include an exclusive list of criteria for which ajuror
would be excused or exempted from jury service.2 3 Moreover, Congress sought to foster its policy of representativeness by specifying that
"the names of prospective jurors shall be selected from the voter registration lists... [or] some other source.., of names in addition to
voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights
24
secured by section 1861 and 1862 [of the Act]."
The Act has, for the most part, solved the problem of intentional
discrimination in the jury selection process. 25 By imposing strict procedural guidelines requiring random jury selection at each stage in
the process, the Act virtually eliminates the opportunity to discriminate through the exercise of discretionary selection procedures. 26 Re18 See Munsterman, supra note 3, at 59 (cataloging the potential problems that may
occur in the jury selection process).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, at 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 1792, 1794.
The Act did not, however, attempt to standardize the similarly diverse selection procedures
employed by state courts.
20 The Jury Selection and Service Act provides, in relevant part:
§ 1861 Declaration of Policy
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the
district or division wherein the court convenes. It is further the policy
of the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be
considered for service on grand and petitjuries in the district courts of
the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, supra note 19, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. at
1794.
22 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (3) (1994) ("These procedures shall be designed to ensure the
random selection of a fair cross section of... persons .... .").
23 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (5)-(6) (1994) (setting boundaries on each district's discretion
to choose excuse and exemption criteria).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1994).
25 See Cynthia A. Williams, Note, Juy Source Representativenessand the Use of Voter RegistrationLists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 590, 602 (1990).
26

Id
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quiring that the criteria for excuse and exemption be set out in
advance adds an additional protection. 27 Rather than treating the
statutory qualification requirements as minimum standards to which a
jury commissioner can add his or her own notions of "good character," the Act specifies that the requirements are the only qualifications
for jury service and, thus, eliminates another opportunity for abuse.2 8
The Act, however, has not had the same success with respect to
guaranteeing minority representation.2 9 The Act's selection of voter
registration lists as the primary source of potential jurors is both controversial and, in some commentators' opinions, itself discriminatory.8 0 -Congress selected voter registration lists as the primary source
of jurors, stating that "these lists provide the widest community cross
section of any list readily available." 3 ' Commentators, however, vigorously dispute this claim.3 2 They argue that voter registration lists are
neither the most widely inclusive nor the most representative3 3 source
34
list available.
The crux of the controversy lies in determining the point at
which a source list is so unrepresentative that supplementation is required. In the final version of the Act, Congress acknowledged that
there would be times when voter registration lists would be insufficient to implement the policies of the Act and should be supple-

Munsterman, supra note 3, at 59-60.
"Except as provided in section 1865 of this title or in any jury selection plan provision adopted pursuant to paragraph (5) or (6) of section 1863(b) of this title, no person or
class of persons shall be disqualified, excluded, excused, or exempt from service as jurors
27
28

...." 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1994).
29
See Williams, supra note 25, at 542 ("Neither the JSSA nor the effectively uniform
jurisprudence upholding the exclusive use of voter registration lists as constitutionally sufficient has ended sixth amendment [sic]
challenges to the composition ofjury source lists
.") (citations omitted).
30 See Stephanie DomitrovichJury Source Lists and the Community's Need to Achieve Racial
Balanceon theJuiy, 33 DuQ. L. REv.39 (1994); Kairys, supra note 5; Munsterman, supra note
3; Williams, supra note 25; Darryl K. Brown, The Means andEnds of RepresentativeJuries,1 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 445 (1994) (book review).
31
See H.R RP. No. 90-1076, supra note 19, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. at
1794. Census and social security lists, which would be more representative than voter registration lists, are kept strictly confidential and are not available by statute. See 13 U.S.C.
§§ 8, 9 (1994) and 15 C.F.R. § 60 (1996) (census lists); 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994) and 20
C.F.R. § 401 (1996) (social security lists).
32 See supra note 30.
33 Inclusiveness refers to the percentage of the population that is on the list. Representativeness is the degree to which the list mirrors the characteristics of the population. A
list can be representative, but not be inclusive. Moreover, generally, as a list becomes more
inclusive, it becomes more representative. "Voters lists typically cover 60 to 80 percent of
the '18 and over' population while drivers lists cover 80 to 95 percent." Munsterman, supra
note 3, at 63.
34 See supra note 30.
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mented with some other source list.35 On the other hand, the
legislative history that accompanies the Act states that "[t] he bill uses

the term 'fair cross section of the community' in order to permit minor deviations from a fully accurate cross section. '3 6 Ultimately, the
decision as to when the Act requires supplementation lies with the
courts.

37

B. Constitutional Standards
1.

The Fifth Amendment Standard

Courts employ two constitutional tests for measuring jury representation and making the determination as to when supplementation
is necessary.3 8 The Fifth Amendment protects defendants from the
effects of a source list skewed by the exclusion of a particular group
35
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (2) (1994) ("The plan shall prescribe some other source or
sources of names in addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect
the rights secured by sections 1861 and 1862 of this title.").
36 H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, supranote 19, at 2, repinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1794.
37 IL See also United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 528 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Congress, however, has left the determination, when necessary, to the judiciary."); United
States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1976) ("Thus instead of prescribing an objective
statutory standard of 'necessity' for determining when supplementation of voter lists was
required, Congress deferred this decision to the courts ....").
38 The standard that the defendant must meet to prove a violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act is the same as the standard a defendant must meet to prove a violation
of the Sixth Amendment. Courts considering the issue have found the "fair and reasonable in relation to the community" test under the Sixth Amendment and the "fair crosssection of the community" test under the Jury Service and Selection Act indistinguishable.
See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We also agree that the
rejection of the Sixth Amendment claim, in the circumstances of this case, necessarily requires rejection of the statutory calm... ."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991); United States
v. Dirasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 282 n.15 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating the same test is to be applied
to a violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act as would be applied to a Sixth Amendment violation), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219,
1227 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The test for a constitutionally selected jury is the same, whether
challenged under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution or under the Jury Selection
and Service Act."); United States v. Rodriquez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1510 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985)
(stating that the test for showing underrepresentation is the same under the Act as it is
under the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 354 n.1 (D.N.J.
1982) ("The 'fair cross section' [requirement] of 28 U.S.C. § 1861 is the functional
equivalent of the 'reasonably representative' standard of the Constitution. Therefore, the
tests for showing underrepresentation under the Constitution and the statute are the
same."), affid sub nora. United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1217 (1984); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1981) ("These
standards are functionally equivalent to those used to enforce 28 U.S.C. § 1861....");
United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he majority of lower federal
courts have responded to this congressional mandate by construing the statutory 'fair cross
section' standard as the functional equivalent of the constitutional 'reasonably representative' standard previously developed."). But see United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
142 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[T]he standards embodied in the Act embrace and go beyond the
constitutional requirements.").
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from the jury selection process.3 9 This standard is most often invoked
to judge cases in which a defendant alleges that the decision to use a
particular source list is discriminatory and does not implement the
Jury Selection and Service Act's policy of promoting minority representation, because a particular group was prevented from gaining inclusion in the source list chosen. 4° In other words, the defendant
asserts the claim that the jury in his case will be biased, because members of a cognizable group to which the defendant belongs were de4
nied their right to serve on a jury. 1
The Supreme Court first applied the equal protection standard in
Strauder v. West Virginia42 to strike down a West Virginia law which excluded African-Americans from grand and petitjury service. 43 In Castaneda v. Partida,44 the Court articulated the much more expansive

standard that controls today. 45 To prevail on a Fifth Amendment
claim in the jury selection context, a defendant must demonstrate
that: (1) the group allegedly excluded is a constitutionally cognizable
group that is capable of being singled out for discriminatory treatment; (2) this group was subject to substantial underrepresentation
over a significant period of time; and (3) thejury selection procedures
used were "susceptible [to] abuse or [were] not racially neutral."' 4
The statistical evidence presented to satisfy the second prong of this
test raises an inference of discrimination, while the third prong of the
test requires that a defendant demonstrate that the alleged discrimination was purposeful. 4 7
39 See Castaneda v. Partida, 480 U.S. 482 (1977) (finding Texas's "key man" system for
composing grand jury venires invalid, because it is discriminatory). See generalyWilliams,
supra note 25, at 596-97.
40 See Williams, supranote 25, at 596-97 (discussing the equal protection standard for
testing jury source list representativeness).
41 This interpretation is consistent with the requirement that only persons who are
members of the group allegedly excluded have standing to make a Fifth Amendment challenge to the jury selection process. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) ("The
defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs.") (emphasis added).
But see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) ("[T]here is no rule that claims such
as Taylor presents may be made only by those defendants who are excluded from jury
service.").
42 100 U.S. 803 (1879).
43

Id. at 304.

44 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
45 Since its decision in Strauder,the Court has extended this protection to both nonrace-related classes and civil proceedings. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (protecting ethnic groups); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (protecting daily wage earning in a civil case). See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & D i.ELJ.
CAPRA, AMERicAN CRIMnIA. PROCEDURE 903-10 (4th ed., West Publishing Co. 1992) (discussing the growth of the "fair cross-section" doctrine).
46 Castaneda,430 U.S. at 494.
47 The Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), explained:
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2.. The Sixth Amendment Standard
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, which views the jury selection process from the perspective of an individual's right to serve on ajury, the
Sixth Amendment's "fair cross-section requirement" is based on the
concept of the jury pool as an integral part of a fair system ofjustice. 48
The importance of a perception of fairness in the judicial system cannot be underestimated.4 9 The "fair cross-section requirement" is intended to protect the integrity of the jury selection system by
guaranteeing a defendant a jury panel that is unbiased and that includes the views of all segments of society.50 At the same time, the
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the "right to be
tried by a particular jury which [is] itself 'a fair cross section of the
community,' nor [the] right to a jury selected at random from the
fairest cross section of the community."5 1 Thus, the "fair cross-section
Those equal protection challenges to jury selection and composition are
not entirely analogous to the case at hand. In the cited cases, the significant discrepancy shown by the statistics not only indicated discriminatory
effect but was also one form of evidence of another essential element of the
constitutional violation-discriminatory purpose. Such evidence is subject
to rebuttal evidence either that discriminatory purpose was not involved or
that such purpose did not have a determinative effect. In contrast, in the
Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself
demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in ajury chosen
from a fair community cross section.
Id. at 368 n.26. Cf Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (decided the same term as Castaneda and requiring a showing of purposeful discrimination to prove an equal protection violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (also requiring a showing of purposeful discrimination to prove an equal protection violation).
48
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) (the jury selection process
.must always accord with the fact that the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the
community.'"); Ramseur v. Beyer 983 F.2d 1215, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (7-5 decision) ("In making our Sixth Amendment analysis, we use standards that are somewhat
different .... A significant reason for this is that the focus of Sixth Amendment protections, more than Fourteenth Amendment protections, is upon the concept of the jury as a
system rather than upon individual rights."), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947 (1993). See generally
Williams, supra note 25, at 598 (explaining the three-part Sixth Amendment test from
Duren v. Missouri).
49 Domitrovich, supra note 30, at 49.
50 See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) ("When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from thejury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable.").
51 United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted). See also
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965) ("Although a... defendant is not entitled
to ajury containing members of his race, a State's purposeful or deliberate denial.., on
account of race of participation asjurors in the administration ofjustice violates the Equal
Protection Clause."); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The Constitution does not require that thejury which tries a criminal defendant 'must mirror the community.'") (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
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requirement" mandates a representative jury source list, but does not
52
extend to the actual jury venire.
In Duren v. Missouri,55 the Supreme Court articulated its standard
forjudging a Sixth Amendment claim. To substantiate a valid claim, a
defendant must show that: (1) the group allegedly being excluded is
part of a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) "the representation of this group . . .is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community;" and (3) "this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the juryselection process."5 4 Unlike the equal protection test, the third prong
of this test does not require a showing of purposeful discrimination.
"[I] n Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, [a] systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in ajury chosen from a fair community cross section." 55 Thus, no
proof of intent is required.
Not requiring a defendant to prove purposeful discrimination
makes the Sixth Amendment test a less stringent standard. 56 In theory, it also makes it easier for a defendant to succeed in challenging a
jury selection system on Sixth Amendment grounds. In practice, however, Sixth Amendment challenges are more common, 57 but not more
successful. 58 This is unfortunate. If the Sixth Amendment is supposed to preserve a perception of fairness in the jury selection system,
it should not take proof of an outrageous underrepresentation to succeed in asserting a claim. The public can lose faith in ajury selection
system that continually yields juries that are unrepresentative of the
community even if the juries are not always single-race juries. 59
52

The legislative history of the Jury Selection and Service Act provides:
The voting list need not perfectly mirror the percentage structure of the
community.... The act guarantees only that the jury shall be 'selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community.' It does not require
that at any stage beyond the initial source list the selection process shall
produce groups that accurately mirror community makeup. Thus, no challenge lies on that basis.
H.1R REP. No. 90-1076, supra note 19, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. at 1794.
53 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
54 Id. at 364.
55 Id. at 368 n.26. See generally Munsterman, supranote 3, at 62 (arguing that the third
prong of the test in Duren eliminates the need to show purposeful discrimination and permits the use of statistical evidence to make a prima facie showing of discrimination).
56
Melissa K. Gee, Note, A Jury Drawnfrom aFair Cross-Section of the Community-A Fading Memory : People v. Sanders, 26 U.S.F. L. Ray. 785, 792 (1992).
57
See Williams, supra note 25, at 602.
58 Despite more than one hundred challenges in federal court, none has ever succeeded in invalidating ajury selection process on the grounds that using voter registration
lists as the sole source of potential jurors is a constitutional violation. See Munsterman,
supra note 3, at 60 n.1.
59 See Domitrovich, supra note 30, at 43-46.
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The Sixth Amendment test is intended to ensure the integrity of
the jury selection system by allowing a defendant to raise a claim
based entirely on statistical evidence. 6 0 A defendant must simply examine the results of the jury selection process and allege, based on the
evidence collected, that a cognizable group has been systematically
excluded from jury service. 6 1 In making a Sixth Amendment claim
based on the use of voter registration lists alone, a defendant is, in
essence, asserting that because certain cognizable groups do not register to vote at the same rate as other groups, the decision to use voter
registration lists as the sole source of potential jurors is discriminatory.
Furthermore, without supplementation, the choice of voter registration lists does not fulfill the Jury Selection and Service Act's policy of
promoting minority representation in the jury selection process. 62 In
short, when a defendant raises a Sixth Amendment challenge based
on the choice of source lists, he or she is challenging the integrity of
the jury system by alleging that the use of voter registration lists as the
sole source of potential jurors is unrepresentative, discriminatory, and
unfair.
C.

Persistent Problems
1.

The Need for a Single Statistical Test

Several difficulties arise for a court when trying to evaluate a
claim based on statistical evidence. Durenwas an easy case and left a
number of issues unresolved. 63 In Duren, the Court had no difficulty
reaching its conclusion that in a locality where women constituted
54% of the population, but only 26.7% of those summoned for jury
duty, a defect existed in the jury selection process. 64 To reach its conclusion, the Court did not have to reach a consensus on the statistical
method to use when evaluating jury 'underrepresentation. Instead,
the Court simply concluded that such a "gross discrepancy" is unacceptable and never considered which of the statistical measures of underrepresentation most commonly used by lower courts should be
applied when judging a Sixth Amendment claim. 65 In a difficult case,
66
however, the choice of statistical measures can be dispositive.
60 See Munsterman, supranote 3, at 62 ("This [test] eliminates the need to show purposeful discrimination and permits the use of statistical evidence to make a prima facie
case that shifts the burden of proof to the other party."). See also supra notes 47, 55.
61
See supra note 60.
62 See supra note 20.
63
See generay Williams, supra note 25, at 598.
64 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 362 (1979).
65
Id. at 365-66. As discussed subsequently in this section, the four most commonly
used measures of underrepresentation are absolute disparity, comparative disparity, statistical significance, and substantial impact.
66
Peter A. Detre, Note, A Proposalfor MeasuringUnderrepresentationin the Composition of
theJuyy VWee 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1914 (1994); Williams, supra note 25, at 606.
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Courts most commonly use the absolute disparity measure when
evaluating jury representation. 67 Absolute disparity measures the difference between a group's percentage in the population and its percentage on the master jury wheel or in the qualified pool. 68 Absolute
disparity, however, fails to account for the range at which the disparity
occurs. 69 For example, an absolute disparity of 10% in ajurisdiction
which is 40% Hispanic is quite different than an absolute disparity of
10% in a district where the population is only 10% Hispanic.7 0 Moreover, as the example illustrates, if a group constitutes a small enough
percentage of the population, the group can be totally excluded from
the jury selection process without the exclusion resulting in an impermissibly large absolute disparity.7 ' The decision to use the absolute
disparity measure to evaluate underrepresentation may significantly
affect the rights of a litigant who happens to be a member of a small
72
minority group.
Comparative disparity, on the other hand, accounts for the size of
the group allegedly being excluded. Comparative disparity is calculated by dividing the absolute disparity by the group's percentage in
the population.7 3 This standard measures the percentage by which
Kairys, supra note 5, at 790.
Equations for each of the measures are presented in the footnotes using the following notation:
P = percentage in the population of the allegedly underrepresented group
L = percentage of the master jury list or qualified jury pool comprised of
members of the allegedly underrepresented group
n = total number of people in the sample
Thus, absolute disparity is defined as
Absolute Disparity = P - L.
69 See, e.g., Kairys, supranote 5, at 793 ("The absolute disparity standard is objectionable on both legal and mathematical grounds, because it fails to account for the range at
which the disparity occurs."); Munsterman, supra note 3, at 64.
70 See Kairys, supra note 5, at 793.
71 As discussed later in this section, although there is no definitive standard for what
constitutes an unacceptable absolute disparity, courts consistently ignore absolute disparities that do not exceed 10%-15%.
72 The Second Circuit reasoned:
The risk of using this approach is that it may too readily tolerate a selection
system in which the seemingly innocuous absence of small numbers of a
minority from an average array creates an unacceptable probability that the
minority members of the jury ultimately selected will be markedly deficient
in number sometimes totally missing.... [T]he Sixth Amendment assures
only the opportunit for a representative jury, rather than a representative
jury itself, but that opportunity can be imperiled if venires regularly lack
even the small numbers of minorities necessary to reflect their proportion
of the population.
United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 904 (1991).
73 Comparative disparity is defined as
67
68

Comparative Disparity

=

P-L
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the probability of serving on ajury is reduced for an individual in the
group allegedly being excluded. 74 Intuitively, this standard measures
the size of the underrepresentation. 75 Returning for a moment to the
example, a 10% underrepresentation of Hispanics in a district where
the population is only 10% Hispanic would result in a comparative
disparity of 100%. Such a large comparative disparity would certainly
signal a problem. 76 Courts, however, have criticized the use of comparative disparity when applied to measuring the underrepresentation
of small minority populations, finding that when applied to these
small populations, reliance on the comparative measure is deceiving.7 7 Supporters of the comparative disparity measure, on the other
hand, argue that this is precisely when the use of comparative disparity is most necessary to protect a litigant's rights. 78 There are strong
74 See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 5, at 790; Munsterman, supra note 3, at 64; Williams,
supra note 25, at 610.
75 See Kairys, supra note 5, at 791, 795 (arguing that comparative disparity ought to be
the single statistical test for underrepresentation, because it best captures the intuitive notion of the fair cross section idea).
76 As discussed later in this section, although there is no definitive standard for what
constitutes an unacceptable comparative disparity, a 100% comparative disparity or total
exclusion would likely be found unacceptable by any court if the disparity persisted for a
significant period of time.
77 Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 834-35 (5th Cir. 1975) (appendix to the opinion
authored by Gerwin, J.). Judge Gerwin argues more generally:
The import ascribed by a court to a deviation from proportional representation will necessarily depend upon whether the deviation is viewed in absolute or comparative terms. Where, for example, [African-Americans]
comprise twenty percent of the presumptively eligibles, their appearance
on 10 percent of the venires can be viewed as a 10 percent deviation under
the absolute [disparity] view, or a 50 percent deviation under a comparative
[disparity] view. While there is authority for the latter measure, the preferable view is that an absolute [disparity] measure should be employed because the comparative [disparity] measure may distort the significance of a
deviation.
Id. at 834-35. See also United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.) ("[T]he smaller the
group is the more the comparative disparity figure distorts the proportional representation."), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th
Cir. 1981) ("This court has not seen fit to adopt the comparative disparity concept as a
better means of calculating underrepresentation."); United States v. Whitiey, 491 F.2d
1248, 1249 (8th Cir.) (Reliance comparative disparity "is ordinarily inappropriate where a
very small proportion of the population is [African-American]," and, "in such circumstances distorts reality."), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272,
279 n.18 (3d Cir.) (Reliance on comparative disparity leads to "absurd results" when the
allegedly underrepresented group constitutes only 4.4% of the population and approximately 2% of the jury list), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); United States v. Musto, 540 F.
Supp. 346, 355 (D.N.J. 1982) (citations omitted) ("Where the eligible population in issue is
relatively low, the comparative disparity will magnify the difference."), aft'd sub nom.,
United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984). But see
Quadra v. Superior Court, 403 F. Supp. 486, 495 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (defending the use
of the comparative disparity measure with small populations, because of the importance of
the group's size in the population to determining the significance of the
underrepresentation).
78 One commentator explained:
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arguments on both sides of this issue, and comparative disparity must
only be used carefully and in the appropriate circumstances. 7 9
Members of a small minority group might also want to rely on the
statistical significance test.8 0 Statistical significance measures the
probability that a given disparity could have resulted from random
selection or chance.8 ' If the challenge is to the source list used and
the probability is low, courts conclude that the disparity resulted from
bias or discrimination in the choice of source lists.82 Statistical significance, however, is difficult to calculate, and the results of the test are
hard to understand.8 3 The test measures the likelihood that the disparity resulted from random chance, but does not indicate anything
about the magnitude of the disparity.8 4

Moreover, like comparative

disparity, the results of a statistical significance test are affected by the
size of the underlying population.8 5 Thus, the statistical significance
test is not nearly as widely used as either absolute or comparative
disparity.
This suggestion would have the effect of applying the absolute disparity
standard where it is least revealing or appropriate. Moreover, application
of the absolute disparity standard where the cognizable class is small means
that almost all underrepresentations... are validated, for by definition, a
small minority can never have a large absolute disparity.
Kairys, supra note 5, at 796 (foomote omitted).
79 For example, if Hispanics represent 3% of adistrict's population, a perfectly representative jury pool of 100 people would include 3 Hispanics. Few would be alarmed if the
pool contained only 2 Hispanics, even though this underrepresentation results in a comparative disparity of 33%. However, if no Hispanics appeared in a series of jury pools,
there would be cause for concern.
80 The results of the statistical significance test are evaluated using a normal distribution table where
(P-L) N*
Z=

/P(1 - P)
81 See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 5, at 792; Munsterman, supra note 3, at 64; Williams,
supra note 25, at 609.
82
Cf Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (concluding that there was a
less than 1 in 10 1 likelihood that the underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans resulted
from random chance); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 n.9 (1972) (noting that
there was a less than I in 20,000 likelihood that low number of African-Americans selected
from the jury pool was the result of random chance); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552
n.2 (1967) (stating that the mathematical probability of having only 7 African Americans
on a venire of 90 when they represented 25-35% of the total 600 is .000006).
83 See Kairys, supra note 5, at 794 n.101 (noting that the statistical significance test
involves complicated calculations, answers that are difficult to visualize and evaluate, and
results that "tell[ ] us there is a disparity without really providing any information concerning how big or substantial the disparity is.").
84

Id.

85

Munsterman, supra note 3, at 64.
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Finally, although the Supreme Court has never considered the
use of the substantial impact test, 86 a number of circuit courts employ
this measure to evaluate minority underrepresentation.8 7 The substantial impact test measures how many additional persons from the
allegedly excluded group would'need to be added to each jury venire
to achieve perfect representation. 8 8 For example, if Hispanics constitute 10% of the population, but only 5% of the master jury list, correcting the underrepresentation would add 1.5 Hispanics to each
thirty person grand jury venire. Although the results of the substantial impact test are easy to understand, clearly an advantage for any
test, critics complain that the test is merely another way of expressing
absolute disparity8 9 and claim that the test suffers from the same defects. 90 United States v. Jenkins 91 provides the best illustration of their
complaint In Jenkins, African-Americans constituted 5.45% of the
population and 3.3% of the jury pool. 92 Yet, despite labeling a comparative disparity of 40% "substantial indeed," the Second Circuit nevertheless held that the disparity was insubstantial, because correcting
it would add only one African-American to each sixty person grand
jury venire. 93 As Jenkins illustrates, the decision to measure underrepresentation using a test based on absolute disparity can create the
risk that a disparity that might otherwise be found unacceptable will
be permitted to persist.

2.

The Need for a Clear Numeric Cutoff

Adoption of a single statistical test alone, however, is insufficient
to end underrepresentation. The relevant issue is at what point the
disparity becomes too great and the jury selection system loses its presumption of validity.94 In addition to choosing an appropriate
method by which to measure underrepresentation, the Supreme

=

86 The substantial impact test can be calculated using the following formula: Impact
(P - L ) x Size of the Venire.

87 See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 904 (1991); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 588 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Goff, 509 F.2d 825, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); United States v.Jenkins,
496 F.2d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 1974).
88 See Munsterman, supranote 3, at 64; Williams, supra note 25, at 609.
89 See larys, supra note 5, at 800; Munsterman, supra note 3, at 64-65; Williams, supra

note 25, at 609.
90 According to some critics, the substantial impact test suffers from an additional
defect. By taking into account the size of the actual jury venire, the substantial impact test
introduces another variable that can further distort the result. Introducing the size of the
panel as a variable "confuses" rather than "clarifies" the meaning of the underrepresentation. See Kairys, supra note 5, at 800.
91 496 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1974).
92 1& at 64.
9
Id. at 64-65.
94 See discussion supra Part IA
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Court must specify a numeric cutoff that can be used to identify
when an underrepresentation is unreasonable. To date, the Supreme
Court has not stated what constitutes an unreasonable
underrepresentation. 95
In Duren, the petitioner proved that the Jackson County jury
venires consistently contained approximately 15% women, while, at
96
the same time, women constituted 53% of the population.
Although the lower court found this disparity tolerable, the Supreme
Court concluded that the gap constituted a "gross discrepancy...
requir[ing] the conclusion that women were not fairly represented in
the source from which petit juries were drawn." 97 Earlier, in Swain v.
Alabama,98 the Court held that an underrepresentation of a group by
as much as 10% did not, by itself, establish "purposeful discrimination." 99 Although Swain was a Fifth Amendment case, most courts
have interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions as permitting absolute disparities ranging from 10% to 15%, absent a showing of purposeful discrimination, injury challenges based on both the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. 10 0
95
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (7-5 decision)
("The imbalance necessary to establish an equal protection or Sixth Amendment violation
in the composition of ajury venire is not determined by a bright line test. The Supreme
Court 'has never announced mathematical standards' that would apply to all such challenges."), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 947 (1993). See Kairys, supra note 5, at 779 (arguing that
"[n]either courts nor legislatures have established criteria for distinguishing allowable
from impermissible deviations from the cross-sectional idea").
96 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1979).
97 Id. at 366.
98 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
99 Id.at 208-09.
100 For example, the Fifth Circuit explained:
The Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama held that underrepresentation by
as much as ten percent did not show purposeful discrimination based on
race. We recognize, however, that Swain was an equal protection case
where purposeful discrimination must be shown and that the Court in
Duren stated that a defendant need not show discriminatory purpose for the
sixth amendment violation. The Court in Duren, however, discussed the
statistical discrepancy needed to make out an equal protection violation
along with its discussion of the disproportion that demonstrates a sixth
amendment violation. Thus, while the Court stated that statistical evidence
is used to prove different elements in equal protection and sixth amendment claims, it did not indicate that the necessary amount of disparity itself
would differ.
United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). See
alsoFosterv. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805,828,831-32 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing the import of the
10-15% "Demarcation [sic] point" in Swain). See also United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23
(1st Cir. 1994) (absolute disparity of 3.4% found permissible); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d
at 1232 (absolute disparity of 14.1% found permissible); United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d
21, 23 (1st Cir.) (absolute disparity of 2.02% found permissible), cert.
denied,466 U.S. 962
(1984); United States v. Biaggi, 680 F.Supp. 641, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (4.7% absolute disparity found permissible), affd, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 904
(1991); United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 356 (D.N.J. 1982) (absolute disparity of
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A similar problem exists with using comparative disparity and statistical significance. The Supreme Court has never definitively stated
what constitutes an unacceptable comparative disparity and has provided even less guidance on the use of the statistical. significance
test. 10 1 The Court found a comparative disparity of 42% permissible
in Swain v. Alabama,0 2 but condemned without further comment a
smaller disparity in Turner v. Fouche.x03 'With respect to statistical significance, not only has the Court failed to set a numeric cutoff, but
the Court's use of the test has left lower courts wondering whether the
statistical significance test has any applicability to Sixth Amendment
challenges, or whether its use is limited to Fifth Amendment cases in
which purposeful. discrimination is an essential element of the
o4
claim.1
A third difficulty arises in applying the Duren test to certain minority groups. Women, unlike some other groups, are easily identifiable and more often than not distinguished from men on a source list.
The same is not necessarily true for racial or ethnic minorities. Take
Hispanics for example. Hispanics are not a distinct group in the same
way that men and women, or even blacks and whites, are a unique
group. According to the Census Bureau, Hispanics are a "self-identified" minority, and an individual is free to choose to be considered
Hispanic or may decline the label altogether. 10 5 Moreover, voter re5.4% found permissible), af/'d sub'nom., United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); Bryant v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1373, 1377-78
(l1th Cir. 1982) (absolute disparity of 7.4% found permissible), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932
(1983); United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1981) (absolute disparity of
5.45% found permissible), cet. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Clifford, 640
F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1981) (absolute disparity of 7.2% found permissible); United States ex
reL Barksdale v. Blackburn, 639 F.2d 1115, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1981) (absolute disparity of
11.5% found permissible), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981); United States v. Armstrong,
621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1980) (absolute disparity of 2.8% found permissible); United States
v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1980) (absolute disparity of 10% found permissible);
United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1977) (absolute disparity of 2.7% found
permissible); Thompson v. Sheppard, 490 F.2d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1974) (absolute disparity of 11.0% found permissible), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 984 (1975).
101 See discussion*supra Part I.B.
102 380 U.S. 202, 204 (1965) (African-Americans constituted 26% of the population
and 15% of the grand and petit jury panels drawn).
103 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (African-Americans constituted 60% of the population and
37% of the grand jury lists resulting in a comparative disparity of 38%).
104
The Supreme Court came the closest to suggesting a standard in a footnote in
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The Court commented that "[a]s a general rule
for such large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed
number is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury
drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist" Id at 496 n.17. However, there
is still a great deal of confusion as to when the use of the measure is appropriate. SeeDetre,
supra note 66, at 1916-20, 1923-25.
105 See Record at TRI p. 77 and TR2 p. 51, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199
(E.D. Pa. 1995); see also Williams, supra note 25, at 607.
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gistration lists rarely, if ever, contain a voter's ethnicity, and in most
10 6
instances, do not specify a voter's race.
3.

The Need for a ClearerDefinition of "Cognizable Group"

Although the Court's jurisprudence defining what constitutes a
cognizable group is relatively settled, at least with respect to sex and
race, 10 7 the lack of defining characteristics for certain groups has important practical consequences for a court when trying to evaluate a
jury challenge. 108 Good data are essential to using any statistical measure to accurately evaluate the significance of a disparity. It is, however, difficult to accurately estimate a group's percentage of a source
list if the source list does not designate who the members of a group
are, and the group is free to self-identify. 10 9 In these circumstances,
an alternative and sometimes controversial means of estimating a
group's representation must be employed. 110
4.

The Need for Clarification: Master Jury List v. Qualified Jury
Pool

Applying the test the Supreme Court formulated in Duren is difficult for a final reason. In Duren, the petitioner was challenging the
validity of the qualified jury pool and not the validity of the source list
used."' The petitioner alleged that by allowing women to request an
automatic exemption from jury service when they returned their jury
questionnaire, the resulting qualified pool underrepresented women. 112 The truth of the petitioner's claim is evident from the
106
See, e.g., Stipulation ofJosephJ. Rogers, Administrative Services Manager, United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at 2, United States v. Ortiz, 897
F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that of the 10 counties in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania only Philadelphia County's voter registration form asks for an individual's
race and none ask if an individual is Hispanic).
107 Judge Gerwin noted that the definition of cognizanibility dates back to the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Hernandez v. Texas. See Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805,
819 (1975).
108
See Brief for the Government at 9, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
109
See generaly Williams, supra note 25, at 606. The problem is further complicated
when individuals return theirjury questionnaire, but do not specify their race or ethnicity.
See discussion infra Part 1.A.
110 See Brief for the Government at 13-18, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.

Pa. 1995) (defending the use of Spanish surname analysis); United States v. Brummitt, 665
F.2d 521, 527-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (accepting surname analysis as a valid method of estimating the percentage of Hispanics on the master jury list, but rejecting the factual proof as
insufficient to substantiate a claim). See generallyPOPULATION DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TECHNICAL WORKING PAPER No. 4, EVALUATING THE PASSELWORD SPANISH SURNAME LIST: 1990 DECENNIAL CENSUS POST ENUMERATION SURVEY RESULTS

(1993) (explaining surname analysis); Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at 4-5, United States
v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (same).

111

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1979).

112
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Court's decision. The decision, however, left open the question of
whether a court should examine the representativeness of the source
list or its effects on the resulting qualified pool. Does the right to a
jury drawn from a "fair cross-section of the community" mean a jury
drawn from a representative source list, or does it mean that the re11 3
sulting qualified pool must also be representative?
D. Duren: An Excuse for Lower Courts
These unresolved issues are reflected in the way lower courts tend
to deal with challenges to the use of voter registration lists. Rather
than considering whether the facts in a given case substantiate the
claim, courts too often decide that the use of voter registration lists as
the sole source of potential jurors is constitutionally permissible as a
matter of law.11 4 Courts repeatedly conclude that to succeed, a defendant must demonstrate that a cognizable group has systematically
been excluded, and that "[p]ersons who choose not to register to vote
do not comprise such a cognizable group."' 1 5 By this logic, any claim
113 It is important to note that a right to ajury drawn from a representative "qualified
pool" would be affected by factors arguably beyond the scope of the government's control.
See discussion infra Part m.
114 For example, the court in United States v. Cecil concluded:
[T]he unbroken line of federal cases in this Circuit to the same effect are
cited with the hope that 'it will be perceived that the principles of stare
decisis are... applicable' here. In summary, as a matter of law, the construction of the defendants of Section 1863 and the constitutional mandate in
this matter is contrary to established precedent and the challenge of the
defendants to the use of the voter registration list in this case, because
members of a cognizable class were not adequately represented in the jury
selection by reason of the failure of members of that class to register,
should be dismissed as a matter of law.
United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1448, 1451 (4th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). Likewise, the court in United States v. Test explained:
[T]he circuits are in complete agreement that.., neither the Act nor the
Constitution require that a supplemental source of names be added to
voter lists simply because an identifiable group votes in a proportion lower
than the rest of the population.... Although we could base our decision
on this ground alone, we will proceed to consider defendants' remaining
contentions.
United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 586 n.8 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lewis, 472
F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1972) ("We hold as a matter of law that the defendant has failed to
sustain this burden.") (emphasis added); United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664, 671 (2d Cir.
1968) ("It is well established that the use of voter registration lists as the source of names of
prospectivejurors is not unlawful because it results in the exclusion of nonvoters."), vacated
and remanded on othergrounds, 394 U.S. 310; United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199, 203
(E.D. Pa. 1995) ("We need not decide whether Hispanics are or can be a 'distinctive
group.' ... Even assuming that Hispanics are a distinctive group and the defendants' statistics are accurate, we find no constitutional or statutory violation.").
115 United States v. Affierbach, 754 F.2d 866, 869 (10th Cir. 1985). The court in
United States v. Brummitt reached a similar conclusion:
The mere fact that an identifiable minority group votes in a proportion
lower than the rest of the population and is therefore underrepresented on
jury panels presents no constitutional issue.... This court has held that
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that asserts that a group has been excluded from the jury selection
process because its members do not register to vote in proportion to
116
members of other groups must fail.
This logic, however, is fundamentally flawed. First, it confuses
the rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.""7 The Sixth
Amendment protects a defendant's right to be tried by ajury chosen
from a "fair cross-section of the community," and not an individual's
right to serve on a jury.118 If certain segments of the population are
not registering to vote regardless of their eligibility, the right to ajury
drawn from a "fair cross-section of the community" can never be protected by using voter registration lists as the sole source of potential
jurors. Second, the usual claim is not that the individuals who failed
to register to vote are a cognizable class, but that those individuals
who typically do not register to vote are themselves members of tradifailure of an identifiable group to register and vote does not render invalid
the selection ofjurors from a voter registration list.
United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Clifford,
640 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The mere fact that one identifiable group of individuals votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population does not make ajury selection system illegal or unconstitutional."); United States v. Lopez, 588 F.2d 450, 452 (5th
Cir.) ("The fact that an identifiable minority group votes in a proportion lower than the
rest of the population and is therefore underrepresented on jury panels presents no constitutional issue."), cert. denied 442 U.S. 947 (1979) (quoting United States v. Arlt, 567 F.2d
1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1972)
("[T]hose who do not choose to register to vote cannot be considered a 'cognizable
group.' ... Further, their non-registration is a result of their own inaction; not a result of
affirmative conduct by others to bar their registration. Therefore, while a fairer cross section of the community may have been produced by the use of 'other sources of names,' the
Plan's sole reliance on voter registration lists was constitutionally permissible.") (quoting
Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 (1969)).
116 Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky argue that
[t]his reasoning is tautological [and] allows voter registration lists to be
upheld by their bootstraps: all disparities between a voter registration list
and the population result from an identifiable group voting in a proportion
lower than the rest of the population, and to validate the use of voter registration lists on this basis is to validate all voter registration lists, no matter
how underrepresentative.
Kairys, supra note 5, at 814 (footnotes omitted).
117 See, e.g., Gee, supra note 56, at 792 ("[C]ourts are sometimes confused in analyzing
the two types of challenges to jury composition: fair cross-section and equal protection
claims.").
118 Judge Wyzanski in United States v. Burkett, 342 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (D. Mass.
1972), noted that
[t]he defendant has a [Sixth Amendment] right.., not to have the pool
diminished at the start by the actions or inactions of public officials, nor by
the inertia, indifference, or inconvenience of any substantial group or class
who do not choose to vote or to serve on juries. From the viewpoint of a
black, or young, or poor, or rich defendant, his interest is in having a pool
with a fair proportion of blacks, young, poor, and rich.
See also Gee, supra note 56, at 792-93 (discussing the difference between the rights protected by the Sixth Amendment and the rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
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tionally cognizable groups. Their failure to register to vote results in
the underrepresentation of these traditionally cognizable groups in
the jury selection process. Finally, the conclusion too quickly dismisses the long history of legal and structural barriers to voter registration, some of which, arguably, still exist today. 119
Moreover, courts often accompany the conclusion that "people
who do not register to vote are not a cognizable group" with the assertion that Congress endorsed the use of voter registration lists. 120 To a
certain extent, Congress did. 12 1 However, as discussed earlier, Congress also recognized that in certain situations courts would need to
supplement voter registration lists in order to ensure minority representation onjuries. 12 2 To assert that Congress wished to create a presumption of validity for the exclusive use of voter registration lists
would simply be factually incorrect. In 1977, faced with a mounting
number of challenges, the Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System proposed an amendment to the Jury Selection and Service Act

119 See Williams, supra note 25, at 593.
120 See, e.g., United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1445 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The use of
[voter registration lists] as the source for jury selection in federal courts has been e-pressly
sanctioned by Congress.. . .") (emphasis added); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 645, 654 (8th
Cir. 1986) ("Although some identifiable groups are underrepresented on voter-registration
lists, this Court held in United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1975), that use of
jury rolls derived from such lists does not result in constitutionally impermissible exclusion, unless those under-represented persons were obstructed from registering."); United
States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 192 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he principal, if not sole, source is
to be voter registration lists for random selection. Use of such lists as the sole source of
names for jury duty is constitutionally permissible unless this system results in the systematic exclusion of a 'cognizable group or class of qualified citizens.'") (quoting Camp v.
United States, 413 F.2d 419 (5th Cir.), cert. denieA 369 U.S. 968 (1969)); United States v.
Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 255-56 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Congress determined that the principal
source of names for the random selection should be either 'the voter registration lists or
the lists of actual voters....
'Use of voter registration lists as the sole source of names for
jury duty is constitutionally permissible unless this system results in the systematic exclusion
of a cognizable group or class of qualified citizens.'").
121 The legislative history of the act contains substantial support for this proposition.
Congress found that voter registration lists would "provide the widest community cross
section." H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, supranote 19, at 2, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.N. at 1794.
Moreover, Congress felt that voter registration lists would provide an important screening
function. The legislative history of the Act calls voter registration lists "[t]he initial line of
defense against incompetence" and states that voter registration lists are meant to "eliminate[ ] those individuals who are either unqualified to vote or insufficiently interested in
the world about them to do so." Id. at 1795-96. In formulating its position, Congress acknowledged that the use of voter registration lists would "discriminate[ ] against those who
have the requisite qualifications for jury service but who do not register to vote," and decided that "[t]his is not unfair... because anyone with minimal qualifications-qualifications that are relevant to jury service--can cause his name to be placed on the lists simply
by registering or voting." Id. at 1794-95. In the words of Congress, "sources of names other
than voter lists may be used to suppement but not supplan, voter lists." Id. at 1794.
122 See discussion supra Part I.A
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that would have created such a presumption. 123 This amendment,
124
however, was never adopted, and has never again been considered.
The most recalcitrant courts refuse to consider the merits of a
Sixth Amendment challenge, because no challenge has ever succeeded. 125 Given that the Act requires courts to "prescribe some
other source.., where necessary"' 2 6 and Congress left this decision to
the courts, an outright refusal to consider the merits of a Sixth
Amendment challenge is clearly not in keeping with the spirit or the
language of the Act. Such bold resistance to supplementation, however, has led some to conclude that "[u]nless the Supreme Court
changes legal ground that appears to be thoroughly settled, challenges to jury arrays based on the underrepresentation of a cognizable
group among registered voters will fall so long as the freedom of eligible persons to register to vote is not obstructed."' 27 The Court in Cecil
put it more succinctly when it wrote:
The authorities cited, from practically every Circuit including our
own, in many of which certiorari has consistently been denied by
the Supreme Court, as well as the legislative intent expressed in the
Jury Selection Act itself, as found by the courts, categorically establish that there is no violation of the jury cross-section requirement
where there is merely underrepresentation of a cognizable class by
128
reason of failure to register, when that right is fully open.
II
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF USING MULTIPLE
SOURCE LISTS

Despite the callous attitude adopted by these courts, minority
groups are not actually harmed by their repeated refusal to require
supplementation. Although the use of supplemental source lists is
aimed at achieving a laudable goal, good intentions by themselves are
not necessarily adequate guideposts for setting policy. 12 9 In addition
123

Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the judicial Con-

ference of the United States 9 (Apr. 7, 1976).
124 Kairys, supra note 5, at 816-18; Munsterman, supra note 3, at 60; Williams, supra
note 25, at 601.
125 In United States v. Cecil, the Fourth Circuit opined:
In light of this, to suggest, as defendants do, that the Act's use of voter
registration lists violates the Constitution, simply goes too far.... Of course
voter registration lists are imperfect ... but this does not render use of
th[ese] lists unconstitutional, especially considering the alternative, which
is... [to] supplement voter lists accordingly. No court has ever required
this, and for good reason.
Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1444.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1994).
127 Newman, supra note 8, at 7.
128 Ceci, 836 F.2d at 1448.
129 Newman, supra note 8, at 7.
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to examining intentions, one must assess the effectiveness of the policy. Data from eighteen federal districts demonstrate that using multiple source lists does not necessarily increase minority
representation.1 3 0 Thus, even if the petitioner in each of these cases
had received his desired outcome, there is no guarantee that minority
representation in the jury selection process would have been
improved.
A.

Other Empirical Studies

Studies of this issue almost universally call for the use of supplemental source lists. 13 1 However, the empirical proof offered by these
studies fails to substantiate a claim that using multiple source lists will
improve minority representation. The empirical proof offered generally consists of a showing that voter registration lists underrepresent
32
minorities and that a combined source list improves inclusiveness.
These studies, however, generally omit empirical proof that a com130
131

See discussion infra Part ll.B.
One commentator has suggested:

The remedy necessary to actuate the requirements of the sixth amendment
[sic] was discussed in, but not achieved by the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968: courts must... order mandatory supplementation of voter
registration lists by other source lists to create jury pools that represent a
fair cross section of the community ....
Williams, supra note 25, at 630; see also Kairys, supra note 5, at 825 ("Multiple list procedures are necessary to overcome the biases and exclusiveness inherent in available single
lists."); Munsterman, supranote 3, at 74 (suggesting the use of supplemental source lists as
one solution to the problem of minority underrepresentation in the jury selection process). But see Newman, supra note 8, at 20 ("[T]he available evidence suggests that drivers
licenses should not be used.") (emphasis added).
132

In her article, Williams first presents data contained in the CURRENT POPULATION

REPORT on voting and registration in the November 1988 Election which shows that African-Americans, Hispanics, and low-income individuals register to vote at lower rates than
other groups. Williams, supra note 25, at 615 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, Series P-20, No. 440, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT: VOTING AND RIEGISTRATION

1988 ELECrION (1989)). She then simply concludes that "a number of... lists could
be merged with voter registration lists to create a more representative ... jury pool." Id. at
632. She offers no empirical proof for her assertion. Id. In an earlier study, Kairys, KaIN THE

dane, and Lehoczky went a step further. They used data from the CURRENT POPULATION
REPORT for the 1972 and 1974 elections and demonstrated not only that certain minority
groups are represented in lower proportion on voter registration lists, but also that voter
registration lists as a whole are underinclusive. Kairys, supranote 5, at 805-07. In the 1974
election, for instance, 38% of those eligible to register to vote did not register, and only
45% of the population actually voted. Id. at 805-06. Moreover, while 36.5% of eligible
white individuals did not register to vote, 45.1% of the eligible African-American community and 65.1% of the eligible Hispanic community did not register. . at 807. Kairys,
Kadane, and Lehoczky's study, however, suffers from the same defect as Williams' study.
After presenting this information, they simply conclude that "[m]ultiple list procedures
are necessary to overcome the biases," without offering empirical evidence to substantiate
their claim. Id. at 825. In fact, they admit that their study lacks "data concerning representativeness." Id. at 806 n.158.
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The demonstration of in-

creased inclusiveness and the general proposition that a more
inclusive source list is more likely to be representative are assumed
without empirical evidence to be sufficient to prove that using driver's
license lists to supplement voter registration lists will increase minority
representation in the jury selection process.

4

Although the argument is theoretically appealing, 3 5 it is factually
incorrect. 3 6 As studies began to look further and to examine the actual effects of combining voter registration lists with lists of licensed
drivers, it became clear that minority representation does not always
improve. 137 In their 1986 article, Munsterman and Munsterman collected a number of studies done by courts around the country and
found the data far from convincing. 3 8 Despite the apparent increase

in coverage of the combined source lists, 3 9 the resulting improvements in representation were, at best, "mixed."140 Kairys, Kadane, and
Lechoczky explain that care must be taken to select a supplemental
list that increases the total number of unique names. "If a group is
138
See supra notes 131-32. For a discussion of "inclusiveness" versus "representativeness," see supra note 33.
134
See Kairys, supra note 5, at 825-26 (explaining why multiple source lists are neces-

sary to overcome bias).
135
It seems logical that a 100% inclusive source list must be perfectly representative,
and, thus, as the inclusiveness increases and approaches 100%, the representation must
necessarily improve.
136
The empirical evidence offered in the remainder of this section refutes this
argument.
137
See, e.g., Munsterman, supra note 3, at 65-74; Newman, supra note 8, at 7-21.
138 In a study done by the Court in New Castle County, Delaware, the addition of
driver's license lists caused the proportion of non-whites serving on juries to change from
an underrepresentation to an overrepresentation. Munsterman, supranote 3, at 71-72. In
Los Angeles County, on the other hand, the supplemental use of driver's license lists
slightly improved the representation of Hispanics, but reduced the representation of African-Americans. Id. In Des Moines, Iowa, although the impact proved minimal, the addition of driver's license lists reduced the representation of non-whites. Id. at 72-73. In the
Northern District of Illinois, a court study showed that for the Eastern Division, using only
the list of licensed drivers would reduce the representation of African-Americans by 1.04%
on the master jury list and by 2.07% in the qualified jury pool. Newman, supranote 8, at
14. In contrast, the study showed that Hispanics would be shifted "from a position of underrepresentation to one of overrepresentation." R& In the Western Division, the study
demonstrated that using names from only the driver's license list would increase the representation of African-Americans by a mere 0.54% and Hispanics by a mere 0.92%. Id. at 16.
The study concluded that because the sole use of driver's license lists is not an option
under the Act, and the already minimal effect of supplementation would be diminished
when the driver's license lists are combined with voter registration lists as required, the
Northern District should not go to a system of choosingjurors from a combined source list.
Id. at 17, 20.
139 Munsterman and Munsterman found that when driver's license lists were added to
voter registration lists, inclusiveness improved in twenty-four states by at least 21%, in seventeen states by anywhere from 11% to 20%, and in seven states by less than 10%. Munsterman, supra note 3, at 67.
140 Id at 73.
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underrepresented on all the lists [and the lists contain the same individuals, the group] will be underrepresented in the combined source
no matter how many lists are used."' 41 To increase minority representation, the supplemental list used must contain names that do not appear on the primary source list. 142 Thus, the choice of supplemental
source lists is crucial.
B.

An Investigation of the Use of Multiple Source Lists in
Federal Court

An examination of data from eighteen federal district courts
proves that driver's license lists do not overrepresent African-Americans or Hispanics, and their use as a supplemental source list does not
always improve these groups' representation in the jury selection process. 14 Table A reports absolute disparity by division for eighteen federal districts. Nine of the districts shown currently use a source list
that combines voter registration lists and lists of licensed drivers.'4
The other nine districts compile their master jury wheel from voter
registration lists alone. 145
141
Kairys, supra note 5, at 825. They further warn that "supplementation with some
lists can increase a group's underrepresentation or create an underrepresentation of another group." Id.
142
Id. Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky suggest that using public assistance or unemployment lists would improve the representation of minorities who are traditionally excluded,
but they offer no empirical evidence to support their claim. See supranote 7.
143
See discussion infra Part I.B.
144 See U.S. District Court, Northern District of New York, Jury Plan, supra note 4, at 3;
U.S. District Court, Western District ofNewYork,Jury Plan, supra note 2, at 2; U.S. District
Court, Northern District of Texas, Jury Plan, supranote 4, at 4; U.S. District Court, District
of Connecticut, Second Restated Plan for Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors,
supranote 2, at 3; U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, General Order No. 6,
Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, supra note 4, at 3; U.S. District
Court, Western District of Michigan, Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit
Jurors, supra note 4, at 2-3; U.S. District Court, District of New Hampshire, Plan for the
Random Selection of Grand & Petit Jurors for Service, supra note 4, at 4; U.S. District
Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Administrative Order No. 79, Procedure for Filling
the Master Jury Wheel, supra note 4, at 1; U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois,
Plan for the Random Selection ofJurors, supranote 4, at 2 (finding that the combined lists
represent a "fair cross-section of the community").
145
See U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 2 (certifiedJuly 18, 1995); U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and PetitJurors, at 4 (certified
May 11, 1993); U.S. District Court, District of Maine, Plan for the Random Selection of
Grand and PetitJurors, at 2 (certified Oct. 29, 1992); U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of California, Amended Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors, at 3
(certified Mar. 11, 1992); U.S. District Court, District of Vermont, Plan for the Random
Selection of Grand and PetitJurors for Service, at 7 (certifiedJune 1, 1989); U.S. District
Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania,Juror Selection Plan, at 2 (certified Mar. 13, 1989);
U.S. District Court, Southern District of CaliforniaJury Selection Plan, at 2 (certified Feb.
14, 1989); U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, AmendedJury Selection Plan, at 3 (certified Jan. 3, 1989); U.S. District Court, Northern District of Florida, Plan for the Random
Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors as Amended 1989, at 7 (certified June 1, 1989).
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As Table B indicates, the average underrepresentation of AfricanAmericans in the districts that use only voter registration lists is less
than the average underrepresentation in the districts that use a combined source list. On an overall basis, the average absolute disparity in
those districts relying solely on voter registration lists is 1.60%, while
the average absolute disparity in those districts that use combined
source lists is 2.51%.146 Moreover, because of the importance of comparing similar underlying populations, regional averages were calculated. 14 7 In all three instances, the average absolute disparity was less
when only voter registration lists were used.
TABLE A
48
ABSOLUTE DISPARrY ON THE MASTER JURY LIST'
African-Americans
Population

List

Hispanics
Absolute
Disparity

Population

List

Absolute
Disparity

Currently Using Supplemental Source Lists
N.D. California
San Francisco/Eureka
San Jose
D. Connecticut
Bridgeport
Har or
New Haven

9.00%
3.70%

7.89%
2.84%

1.02%
0.86%

11.80%
20.50%

8.71%
16.93%

3.09%
3.57%

8.36%
6.34%
7.08%

5.41%
3.69%
4.27%

2.95%
2.65%
2.81%

7.38%
5.07%
4.24%

3.72%
2.10%
2.04%

3.66%
2.97%
2.20%

146 For a discussion of absolute disparity, see supra Part I.C and notes 68-72.
147 As was mentioned in discussing absolute disparity, an absolute disparity of 10% in a
jurisdiction which is 40% Hispanic is quite different than an absolute disparity of 10% in a
district where the population is only 10% Hispanic. Thus, in comparing the average absolute disparity from districts that use multiple source lists with the average absolute disparity
from districts that do not, it was important to consider the characteristics of the underlying
population. To ensure that the population has similar attributes, regional averages were
prepared. The averages calculated for the Northeast region include data from the District
of New Hampshire, the District of Maine, and the District of Vermont. The averages calculated for the Southwest region include data from the Northern District of California, the
Northern District of Texas, the District of Arizona, the Eastern District of California, the
Central District of California, and the Southern District of California. The averages calculated for the heavily Hispanic states include data from the Northern District of California,
the Northern District of Texas, the District of Arizona, the Eastern District of California,
the Central District of California, the Southern District of California, the Northern District
of Florida, and the Southern District of Florida. The "heavily Hispanic states" grouping is
based on a Census Bureau study which identified the eleven states with the highest proportion of Hispanics in the general population. See R. COLBY PERKINS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TECHNICAL WORKING PAPER No. 4, EVALUATING THE PASSEL-WORD SPANISH SURNAME
LIST: 1990 DECENNIAL CENSUS POST ENUMERATION SURVEY RESULTS (1993).

148 The data contained in Tables A-D were provided by the district court clerk's office
in the district to which the data pertains. In most instances, the clerk of the court used
government form JS-12 to record the race and ethnicity information. In other instances,
the clerk provided a report unique to the given district, and data from the 1990 Census of
the Population were used to determine the racial and ethnic composition of the
population within the district eligible for jury service. In all instances, the most recent
available data were used. All data are on file with the author. In keeping with the formulas
discussed in Part I, underrepresentations are shown as positive numbers and
overrepresentations as negative numbers.
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African-Americans

C.D. Illinois
Danville
Peoria
Rock Island
Springfield
W.D. Michigan
Grand Rapids
Kalamazoo
Lansing
Marquette
D. New Hampshire
N.D. New York
Albany
Auburn
Binghamton
Syracuse
Utica
Watertown
W.D. New York
Buffalo
M.D. Tennessee
Columbia
Cookeville
Nashville
N.D. Texas
Abilene
Amarillo
Dallas
Fort Worth
Lubbock
San Angelo
Wichita Falls

Population

List

7.07%
4.54%
3.82%
3.34%

2.06%
2.08%
0.96%

4.58%
7.72%
5.60%
1.58%

2.19%
6.10%
2.29%
0.00%

0.59%

0.24%

4.20%
2.80%
1.30%
5.00%
3.30%
4.00%

1.00%
0.33%
1.20%
3.00%

Hispanics
Absolute
Disparity

Absolute
Disparity

Population

List

3.77%
2.48%
1.74%
2.38%

1.24%
0.89%
2.92%
0.38%

0.47%
0.46%
1.32%
0.10%

0.77%
0.43%
1.60%
0.28%

2.39%
1.62%
3.31%
1.58%
0.35%

1.97%
1.60%
2.84%
0.33%
0.89%

0.90%
1.24%
2.28%
0.00%
0.20%

1.07%
0.36%
0.56%
0.33%
0.69%

0.00%

3.20%
2.47%
0.10%
2.00%
2.90%
4.00%

1.90%
1.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.90%
2.30%

0.40%
0.67%
0.80%
0.00%
0.00%
1.60%

1.50%
1.13%
0.20%
1.20%
1.90%
0.70%

7.40%

6.07%

1.33%

1.70%

0.10%

1.60%

14.10%
1.10%
8.40%

4.80%
0.50%
9.70%

9.30%
0.60%
-1.30%

0.90%
0.40%
0.40%

1.30%
0.50%
0.00%

-0.40%
-0.10%
0.40%

4.20%
3.30%
16.70%
950%
5.50%
3.10%
6.00%

2.17%
1.52%
9.08%
5.83%
2.42%
1.37%
2.56%

2.03%
1.78%
7.62%
3.67%
3.08%
1.73%
3.44%

13.60%
14.10%
13.50%
9.70%
24.00%
20.00%
6.80%

7.27%
5.77%
5.27%
4.40%
12.41%
10.95%
3.99%

6.33%
8.33%
8.23%
5.30%
11.59%
9.05%
2.81%

3.00%
0.50%
2.92%

2.72%
0.62%
0.67%

0.28%
-0.12%
2.25%

14.90%
6.14%
23.20%

7.85%
3.27%
14.38%

7.05%
2.87%
8.82%

3.80%
5.60%

3.10%
3.63%

0.70%
1.97%

26.60%
11.40%

12.60%
6.05%

14.40%
5.35%

4.30%
12.10%
5.70%

4.00%
14.00%
6.00%

0.30%
-1.97%
-0.30%

13.80%
19.00%
19.18%

11.00%
14.00%
10.00%

2.80%
5.00%
9.18%

14.78%
26.17%

11.99%
20.90%

2.79%
5.27%

12.60%
8.60%
4.60%
17.70%
10.00%

9.00%
2.90%
3.90%
15.30%
5.00%

3.60%
5.70%
0.70%
2.40%
5.00%

8.10%
3.90%
11.30%
50.60%
6.80%

7.70%
1.10%
7.50%
44.10%
4.50%

0.40%
2.80%
3.80%
6.50%
2.30%

0.25%
0.34%

0.00%
0.00%

0.25%
0.34%

0.27%
0.43%

0.31%
0.31%

-0.04%
0.12%

4.00%
0.90%
1.30%
0.30%

1.62%
0.36%
0.16%
0.00%

2.38%
0.54%
1.14%
0.30%

1.20%
0.70%
0.70%
0.70%

0.28%
0.45%
0.08%
0.30%

0.92%
0.25%
0.62%
0.40%

3.30%

0.40%

Using Only Voter Registration Lists
D. Arizona
Phoenix
Prescott
Tucson
E.D. California
Fresno
Sacramento
C.D. California
Southern/Eastern
Western
S.D. California
N.D. Florida
Gainesville
Tallahassee
S.D. Florida
Fort Lauderdale
Fort Pierce

Key West
Miami
Palm Beach
D. Maine
Bangor
Portland
M.D. Pennsylvania
Harrisburg
Scranton
Williamsburg
D. Vermont
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TABLE B
MASTER JURY WHEEL AVERAGE ABSOLUTE DisPARrrY
African-Americans

Overall (all districts)
Northeast Region
Southwest Region
Heavily Hispanic States

Hispanics

Voter/Driver

Voter Only

Voter/Driver

Voter Only

2.51%
0.35%
2.80%
2.80%

1.60%
0.30%
0.40%
1.91%

2.62%
0.69%
6.48%
6.48%

3.87%
0.16%
6.93%
5.48%

For Hispanics, the use of a combined source list seems to improve
representation, but when the aberrant result from the Fresno Division
is removed from the average, 149 the average absolute disparity in both
the Southwest region and the heavily Hispanic states 150 is significantly
lower when only voter registration lists are used. Removing the aberration, the average absolute disparity for those districts in the Southwest region that use only voter registration lists is 5.87% as compared
to 6.48% for those districts in the Southwest region that use a combined source list. Making the same correction for the heavily Hispanic states, using only voter registration lists produces an average
absolute disparity of 4.74% as compared with an average absolute disparity of 6.48% when both voter and driver's license lists are used.
Although the average absolute disparity for all the districts considered
is lower when a combined source list is used, no conclusion should be
drawn from this fact. The population in the nine districts listed that
use supplemental source lists is only 5.72% Hispanic, while the population in the nine districts listed that do not supplement is 11.52%
Hispanic, a more than 50% difference. The different character of the
underlying population makes this comparison less valid. Thus, more
importance should be placed on the results from the Southwest region and the heavily Hispanic states where the Hispanic community is
more prominent, and the underlying populations are more alike. 1' 1
The comparative disparity measure can also be used to standardize the comparison between different underlying populations. 152 As
previously discussed, comparative disparity accounts for a group's rela149 As shown in Table A, the absolute disparity for the Fresno Division was 14.40%,
almost 3 percentage points larger than the next largest absolute. Only the absolute disparity in the Lubbock Division in the Northern District of Texas approaches this magnitude.

Thus, for the purposes of the comparison, this result was considered an aberration and
excluded from the average.
150 See supra note 147.

151

In the Southwest region, the population is 14.89% Hispanic in the districts that use

multiple source lists and 16.78% Hispanic in the districts that use only voter registration
lists. The difference of 1.89% constitutes only an 11.26% change in the composition of the
population. In the heavily Hispanic states, the population is 14.89% Hispanic and 16.53%

Hispanic respectively. This amounts to a difference of 1.64% and only a 9.92% change.
152 For a discussion of comparative disparity, see supraPart I.C and notes 73-79.
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tive size in the underlying population and measures the percentage by
which a member of the group's chances of being-selected for jury service are reduced by the underrepresentation 5 3s Table C, which shows
comparative disparities, even more convincingly demonstrates that
the use of driver's license lists does not improve minority representation in the jury selection process. Using comparative disparity as the
measure, in every instance except one, the representation of AfricanAmericans and Hispanics is better when only voter registration lists
are used. On an overall basis, using a combined source list, the
chances of an African-American being placed on the master jury
wheel are 49.88% less than they should be if the source list used were
a perfect cross-section of the community. Using only voter registration lists, an African-American's chances are decreased by 39.13%. A
member of the Hispanic community's chances of selection are reduced by 51.28% when voter registration lists are supplemented with
driver's license lists. On the other hand, although the chances of selection are less than they should be, they are only diminished by
39.78% when voter registration lists alone are used. As Table C illustrates, similar results occurred in the Northeast region, the Southwest
region, and the heavily Hispanic states for both African-Americans
and Hispanics.
TABLE C
MASTER JURY WHEEL AVERAGE COMPARATiVE DIsPARITY

African-Americans

Overall (all districts)
Northeast Region
Southwest Region
Heavily Hispanic States

Hispanics

Voter/Driver

Voter Only

Voter/Driver

Voter Only

49.88%
59.32%
43.36%
43.98%

39.13%
100.00%
12.75%
20.98%

51.28%
77.53%
44.41%
44.41%

39.78%
23.41%
40.95%
37.28%

Perhaps the best way to evaluate the impact of using multiple
source lists is to compare a group's representation in a given district
before and after the district began using multiple source lists. Assuming no major population shifts occur during the period in question,
using data from the same district virtually eliminates the problem of
differences in the underlying population. Unfortunately, because districts are not required to retain race and ethnicity information for
more than four years (unless ordered by a court),15 4 and districts are
only required to refill their master jury wheel once during this time
153

See supraPart I.C.

154

28 U.S.C. § 1868 (1994).
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period, 15 5 these data are not readily available. 156 However, in those
instances when data were available, the available data confirmed that
using multiple source lists does not necessarily increase minority
representation.
The use of driver's license lists actually increased the underrepresentation of African-Americans on the master jury wheel in the
Buffalo Division from 0.53% to 1.33%. Although at a 95% level of
confidence this increase is not statistically significant, 15 7 the use of
supplemental source lists clearly did not have its intended effect.
With Hispanics, the addition of driver's license lists as a potential
source ofjurors did increase their representation on the Buffalo Division's master jury wheel. But again, at a 95% level of confidence, the
0.36% improvement is so slight that there is no way to conclude that it
did not simply result from random sampling. 158 Although the use of
driver's license lists may have improved the representation of Hispanics on the Buffalo Division's master jury wheel, the results are, at best,
inconclusive.
155

See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (1994).
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts used to require each district
court to file government form JS-12 with the Office each time its master jury wheel was
refilled. Presently, the Administrative Office only requires that the form be completed and
retained by the court in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Jury Selection and
Service Act. Memorandum from Duane R. Lee, Chief, Court Administration Division, to
All Clerks, United States District Courts 1 (Oct. 23, 1992).
157
Proportions can be compared using z procedures based on the normal approximation and on standardizing the difference. DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 590 (2d ed., W.H. Freeman and Co. 1993). To
determine if the proportions differ significantly, a confidence interval can be drawn using
the formula (p] - p2) ± z* SD
where p, = proportion of successes in the first group
P2 = proportion of successes in the second group
nI = size of the first sample
n2 = size of the second sample
156

Sd =

Yi(1--)

+P-

and, z* is standard normal critical value.
Id. at 591. If the confidence interval contains zero, one can be confident that the proportions do not differ significantly. Id. at 592.
Since the absolute disparity before supplementation equals di = pi - pop, and the
absolute disparity after supplementation equals d 2 = p2 - pop, and in every case the population (pop.) remained constant, di - d2 = pi - p2. Thus, the accepted method for comparing
proportions can be used to draw conclusions about the change in the absolute disparities.
5% or a 95% level of confidence is the cutoff probability used in most industrial and
scientific applications. Kairys, supra note 5, at 792 (citing M. DECROOT, PROBABILrIT AND
STATiSTICS 380 (1975)). At a 95% level of confidence, 95 out of 100 times a random sample is drawn the result will fall within the confidence interval. For a more general discussion of statistical significance, see supra Part I.C and notes 80-85.
158 The 0.36% increase which falls within the 95% confidence interval is an observation that could occur in 95 out of 100 cases due solely to the effects of random sampling.
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Information from the District of Connecticut about the effects of
supplementation on the resulting qualified pool is similarly inconclusive. As Table D illustrates, although the improvement in the representation of Hispanics in each of the three divisions is statistically
significant at a 95% confidence level, so is the 1.72% decrease in the
representation of African-Americans in the Bridgeport Division.
Moreover, in the New Haven Division, the addition of driver's license
lists as a source of potential jurors had zero impact on the representation of African-Americans.
The Buffalo Division experienced a similarly ambiguous result
with respect to its qualified jury pool. The use of driver's license lists
increased the representation of both African-Americans and Hispanics in the qualified jury pool. The overrepresentation of AfricanAmericans was increased by 2.20% and the underrepresentation of
Hispanics reduced by 0.2%. However, neither change is statistically
significant at a 95% confidence level, and both could have resulted
from random sampling.
TABLE D
QUALIFIED JURY POOL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHANGE IN ABSOLUTE

DISPAmITY BEFORE AND AFTER BEGINNING SUPPLEMENTATION
African-Americans
Absolute Disparity
Before
After
Change
D. Connecticut
Bridgeport
Hartford
New Haven

-0.86%
3.26%
1.28%

W.D. New York
Buffalo

-0.90%

0.86%
1.74%
1.28%
-3.10%

Hispanics
Absolute Disparity
Significant Before After Change Significani

-1.72%
1.52%
0.00%

Yes
Yes
No

4.78% 3.38%
4.30% 2.77%
2.93% 2.04%

1.40%
1.53%
0.89%

Yes
Yes
Yes

2.20%

No

1.20% 1.00%

0.20%

No

Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence presented refutes the
claim that using multiple source lists improves minority representation, at least when the second list is a list of licensed drivers. Not only
does a large underrepresentation persist after adding driver's license
lists, but in most instances, the underrepresentation increases. The
comparison of the average absolute and comparative disparities from
those districts that use only voter registration lists with the average
disparities from those that supplement their source list clearly evidences this fact. Moreover, the examination of the effects, before and
after, of using multiple source lists confirms this result on a divisionby-division basis. Thus, although using multiple source lists aims at
achieving a worthy goal, courts must use other means if they are going
to solve the problem of minority underrepresentation in the jury selection process.
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III
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING MINORITY REPRESENTATION

Although supplementation does not achieve its intended result,
this does not mean that courts do not have an affirmative obligation
to improve minority representation in thejury selection process. The
Jury Selection and Service Act states that source lists should be supplemented when necessary, but does not state that other steps may not be
taken to ensure that the policies of the Act are achieved.' 5 9 In fact,
§ 1863(a) specifically requires each court to "devise and place into
operation a... plan... that shall be designed to achieve the objectives of [the Act] ."160 The remainder of the Act simply lays out particular provisions aimed at achieving greater minority representation on
juries, but is not intended to limit a court's flexibility in reaching the
goals of the Act. 16'
A.

Re-designing the Jury Questionnaire

The first step in correcting the problem of minority underrepresentation in the jury selection process is to ensure that courts
have complete and accurate information about the racial and ethnic
composition of their jury pools. Courts need complete and accurate
information to measure the size of the problem, to assess the effectiveness of potential remedies, and to monitor the solution once one has
been implemented. A study of returned jury questionnaires in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, shows that currently 74.0%
of the individuals who return their jury questionnaire fail to indicate
their ethnicity. 62 On average, in the eighteen districts listed in Table
A, the race of the juror was unknown in 7.72% of the cases and the
ethnicity of the juror was unknown 20.55% of the time. 6 3 With such
high non-response rates, correcting the problem of underrepresentation becomes more difficult.
See28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1994).
161
See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863-69 (1994).
162 Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at 9, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.
Pa. 1995). Although race and ethnicity are often confused, both social scientists and the
Census Bureau treat them as very different concepts. See Elizabeth Martin et al., Context
159
160

Effects for Census Measures of Race and Hispanic Origin, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 551, 551-54
(1990). See generally FRANK D. BEAN & MARTA TIENDA, NAT'L COMM. FOR RESEARCH ON THE
1980 CENSUS, THE HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE UNITE STATES 7-11 (1987) (defining the
boundaries of Hispanic ethnicity); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT B-7 (1994) (discussing race and ethnicity, "self-identification,"

and the Census Bureau's practice of imputing ethnicity when a question is left blank);
John A. Garcia, Yo Soy Mexicano .. .: Self-Identity and Sociodemographic Correlates,62 Soc. Sci.

Q. 88, 88-91 (Mar. 1981) (explaining the difference between race and ethnicity and the
idea of self-identification).

163

See supra note 148.
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The Census Bureau has studied the non-response issue quite extensively' 6 4 and has found that when answering a questionnaire, the

response to one question "conditions" a respondent's answer to later
questions.'

65

Often, the respondent fails to answer a later question

assuming that his or her response can be inferred from a previous
answer.' 66 Thus, in the case of the jury questionnaire on which question ten asks an individual to indicate his or her race, it is likely that
the individual will omit question eleven, which asks "are you His-

panic," if that the answer can be inferred from the response to question ten. 16 7 However, a Hispanic can be of any race, and the answer is
68
not readily apparent from the response to the previous question.'
To combat the non-response problem, the Census Bureau has experimented with separating the race and ethnicity questions on the

census questionnaire and placing the ethnicity question three questions prior to the race question. 69 In multiple tests, " [p]lacement of
Spanish origin prior to race significantly reduced the nonresponse
rate for the Hispanic origin question, while nonresponse for race remained low and fairly stable." 170 Although the 1990 census form did

not place the race question prior to the ethnicity question, it, at least,
164

See, e.g., NANMCY BATES ET AL-, U.S. DFP'T OF COMMERCE, RESEARCH ON RACE AND

ETHNICnT

RESULTS FROM QuEsTIONNANRE DESIGN TEmTS (1994); JORGE DEL PINAL, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL SCIENCE PINCimPEs: FORMING RACE-ETHNIC CATEGORIES FOR

PoLicY ANALysis (1994); BuREAu OF THE CENSus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CON'TENT DETERMINATION REPORT: RACE AND ETHNIc ORIGIN (1991) [hereinafter CoNTENT DETERmINATION REPORT].
165 BATES, supra note 164, at 13. See also Martin, supra note 162, at 551 ("The effect of

question order may derive from the context invoked by prior questions, which may influence respondents' frame of reference or suggest different interpretations of the question."). "The potential for this type of effect is especially pronounced when the concept
being measured is somewhat unclear," like in the case of a "self-identified" minority. Martin, supra note 162, at 552. See also discussion supra Part I.C.
166 See PINA, supranote 164, at 7 ("[M]ultiple race-ethnicity questions sometimes confuse respondents. As a consequence they may leave one or more questions unanswered.
Respondents may . . .assume the answer can be inferred from answers to previous
questions.").
167 SeeBATES, supra note 164, at 13 ("Presumably, non-Hispanics are more likely to skip
the Spanish origin question when race is asked first because they think a "no" response can
be inferred from their previous answer to race."); PirNL, supra note 164, at 8 ("[S]ome
respondents may only answer the race question and assume that the answer to Hispanic
origin can be inferredfrom their response to the race question.").
1658 United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Hispanics are not a
race. There are both white and black Hispanics."). See alsoAffidavit of Eugene P. Ericksen,
at 5, United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd,909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 904 (1991).
169 SeeBATFS, supra note 164, at 8-21; CONTENT DETERMINATION REPORT, supranote 164,
at 22.
170 BATES, supra note 164, at 19. "The Hispanic origin item nonresponse rates ranged
from 20% to 30% when placed immediately after race, compared to 13% to 17% when
placed 3 items after race." Martin, supra note 162, at 556.
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separated the questions with two unrelated, intervening questions. 171
This is significant, because census data are used as the base line for a
jury challenge. 17 2 If the census form is superior at eliciting a response
from "self-identified" minority groups,'73 then it may be difficult
to defend a challenge to a jury selection system that, in reality, is
74
fair.1
The Census Bureau's experience suggests a simple solution for
courts: revise the jury questionnaire. Placing the ethnicity question
prior to the race question will not add minorities to the source list,
but, at a minimum, courts will have more accurate data with which to
assess the problem. 175 The revision may also reveal that underrepresentations are not as severe as they currently appear to be. With
minimal effort, courts could take an important first step toward remedying the problem of minority underrepresentation.
B.

Mandating that Jury Questionnaires be Returned and
Completed

The second step in improving minority representation involves
ensuring that those individuals who appear on the source list actually
participate in the jury selection process. Any gains made in improving
the representativeness of the jury source list can quickly be lost if the
individuals who are added to the source list do not ultimately participate in the selection process. Of the 52,242 jury questionnaires
mailed to individuals on the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's 1993
master jury wheel, 5,077 questionnaires were returned to the court by
the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable, and another 4,162 questionnaires reached their destination, but were not returned to the court
171 Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at Ex. B, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
172 See, e.g., cases cited supranote 100.
173 See Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at 7-9, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussing the problems caused by the inadequate design of thejury questionnaire). See also discussion supra Part I.C.
174 Defending the validity of ajury selection system is made more difficult for a second
reason. "[N]ationally about 2.0 percent of respondents did not respond to the race question [on the census] and about 10 percent did not answer the Hispanic-origin item."
Pn'AL, supranote 164, at 7. However, when this occurred on the census, the Census Bureau imputed a race or ethnicity to the respondent based on his or her answers to other
questions. IL- Similar information is not available on the jury questionnaire, making it
impossible for courts to undertake the same procedure. See also Affidavit of Dr. Samuel
Preston, at 14-15, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussing the
problem of trying to comparejury data to a census baseline that contains imputed race and
ethnicity).
175
Bates notes that "substantial improvements in the completeness of reporting can be
achieved from rather modest revisions to [the questionnaire]." BATES, supra note 164, at
21.
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by the recipient even after three requests. 176 In other words, 17.69%
177
of the questionnaires were never even considered for jury service.
A similar result was observed in the eighteen districts listed in Table A.
On average, 9.12% of the jury questionnaires were returned to the
court as undeliverable and 9.83% of the jury questionnaires were not
78
returned to the court at all.'

More importantly, this phenomenon does not affect groups
equally. Minorities and low-income individuals tend to be more mobile, 179 and a failure to regularly update jury source lists disparately
impacts these groups. In addition, mail delivery tends to be less reliable in urban areas which typically have higher concentrations of minorities.' 8 0 Finally, in some instances, an inability to speak or read
English affects the rate of return ofjury questionnaires.'18 At a minimum, studies show that when minorities respond to a questionnaire, it
takes them longer to respond than other groups.' 8 2 Thus, juries chosen at the beginning of a new master jury wheel tend to be more underrepresentative than those chosen at the end of the wheel.
These observations suggest that courts should adopt some additional measures. First, courts should more strictly enforce the require176

Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at 4, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.

Pa. 1995).
177 id.

See supra note 148.
Professor Preston opines:
It is likely that a high rate of movement is mainly responsible for the high
fraction of undeliverable questionnaires among Hispanics. My analysis of
the 1990 U.S. Census 5% sample for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
shows that 59.9 percent of the Hispanic population 18 years and over had
lived in their dwelling less than 5 years, compared to only 37.4 percent of
Non-Hispanics.
Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at 4, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Affidavit of Eugene P. Ericksen, at 7, United States v. Biaggi, 680 F.Supp. 641, 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Residents of poor neighborhoods, more likely to be renters, tend to be mobile and often leave no forwarding address."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991).
180 See United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. at 204 ("[D]efendants' expert Ericksen explained that Hispanics were less likely to return the [jury questionnaire for three reasons.
First, many Hispanics are poor. Like other poor people, they are apt to move more frequently than the more affluent, with their mail not being forwarded to their new address.
Secondly, poor people in general have less reliable mail service. Finally, Ericksen reported
that Hispanics were found to be less likely to return census questionnaires and thus presumably less likely to send back jury questionnaires.").
181 See Affidavit of Dr. Samuel Preston, at 4, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199
(E.D. Pa. 1995) ("It is likely that inability to speak or read English is the major reason for
the very high non-return rate among Hispanics. My analysis of the 1990 Census 5% sample
shows that 6.3 percent of Hispanics aged [sic] 18+ in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
could not speak English at all, and another 15.4 percent could not speak English well.").
182 See Affidavit of Eugene P. Ericksen, at tbl.3, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Record at TR 1, 63-70, United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (explaining Ericksen's study and concluding that "Hispanics were slower to return
the questionnaires."). Id. at 65.
178
179
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ment that the jury questionnaire be completed. The Jury Selection
and Service Act empowers the jury clerk to return the jury questionnaire to the respondent when answers to questions are omitted or are
ambiguous.' 8 3 Furthermore, the Act empowers the clerk to summon
individuals who still fail to respond. 8 4 Although summoning non-respondents may not be practical in every case,' 8 5 courts should, at least,
return the jury questionnaire several times in an attempt to receive
complete answers. Few courts actually do this.186 Requiring completion would have benefits similar to improving the jury
questionnaire.

8 7

Second, courts should wait until a third mailing has been completed and the respondents have been qualified before beginning to
select jurors from the new qualified jury pool. This waiting period
would compensate for the longer period of time minorities take to
respond to questionnaires and ensure that all the juries chosen from a
given qualified pool are as representative as they can be. 188 Along
these same lines, courts should set minimums on the number of indi183 See 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (1994) ("In any case in which it appears that there is an
omission, ambiguity, or error in a form, the clerk orjury commission shall return the form
with instructions to the person to make such additions or corrections as may be necessary
184 See 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (1994) ("Any person who fails to return a completed juror
qualification form as instructed may be summoned by the clerk."). But see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1869(h) (1994) ("The form shall contain words clearly informing the person that the
furnishing of any information with respect to his religion, nationalorigin, or economic status is not a prerequisiteto his qualificationfor jury sertice, that such information need not be
furnished if the person finds it objectionable to do so, and that informationconcerningrace is
required solely to enforce nondiscrimination in jury selection and has no bearing on an
individual's qualification for jury service.") (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Gometz wrote:
[T] he issue under the Act is of course not whether it would be a good thing
to follow up on persons who do not respond to ajury questionnaire .... but
only whether the Act imposes any duty on the clerk orjudges of the district
court to follow up on the nonresponders.
730 F.2d 475, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984). The Seventh Circuit court
concluded that the Act:
include[s] no requirement that the district court clerk take measures to
correct a low response rate, so long as it is high enough to generate enough
names for the qualified jury wheel to enable staffing the required number
ofjuries. The Act empowers-not requires-the clerk to pursue those who
fail to return their juror qualification forms ....
Id. at 480.
185 Gometz, 730 F.2d at 480 ("Most district court clerks lack the resources to issue
thousands of summonses every year ... nor should our overworked district judges be required to cite nonresponders for contempt... [A] person forced.., to serve on ajury is
apt to be an angry juror and that.., is a bad juror.").
186
See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. at 201 ("If a person did not answer the
Hispanic ethnicity question, the questionnaire was not sent back as incomplete, since presumably the person had checked another box as to race.").
187 See supra Part M.A.
188 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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viduals that must be in the qualified jury pool before the court will
select ajury from the pool. The Jury Selection and Service Act places
a minimum on the number of individuals on the masterjury wheel, 8 9
but fails to set a minimum for the qualified pool. 9 0 Some districts
like the District of South Carolina have set minimums on the size of
the qualified pool in their jury plans. 19 ' However, courts have failed
to enforce these minimums when the representativeness ofjuries has
been challenged on the ground that the qualified pool did not contain the minimum number of individuals required and was accordingly rendered unrepresentative. 9 2 To be effective, these minimums
must be strictly enforced.
C.

Using Stratified Sampling Techniques

Finally, selecting a stratified sample from the qualified pool as the
third and final step in remedying the problem of minority underrepresentation is perhaps the only way to guarantee that the jury chosen will be one chosen from a fair cross-section of the community. 193
Because even a relatively inclusive source list underrepresents certain
groups, some districts have experimented with stratified sampling
techniques. 9 4 Stratified sampling can work in a number of ways. The
District of Connecticut identifies municipalities with a population that
189 See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (1994) ("The plan shall fix a minimum number of
names to be placed initially on the master jury wheel .. ").
190 United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903, 911 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he Act.
contains no minimum pool size requirement."), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1202 (1983).
191
Id.
192
See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1514 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The Act
...does not require that prospective jurors be conscripted to satisfy some rigid and unrealistic formula."); United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding a 70%
non-response rate tolerable), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Carmichael,
685 F.2d 903, 911 (4th Cir. 1982) (rejecting a challenge to thejury selection system despite
finding that the qualified jury pool contained slightly less than the required 300 names),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Daly, 573 F. Supp. 788, 793 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (finding no "substantial violation" resulting from the failure to follow up on non-returned jury questionnaires);
United States v. Manbeck, 514 F. Supp. 141, 144 (D.S.C. 1981) (finding the fact that the
qualified pool contained 299 names at the time of the first drawing and only 267 names at
the time of the second drawing to be a "technical violation" of the Jury Plan which required 300 names and refusing to dismiss the indictments); United States v. Armsbury, 408
F. Supp. 1130, 1142 (D. Or. 1976) ("A low return rate of questionnaires ... does not
amount to a 'substantial violation.'"). Broadway v. Culpepper, 439 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir.
1971), and Berry v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1978), the only cases to require a clerk
to follow up with non-respondents, imposed the requirement as a means of correcting
proven discrimination. See United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d at 480; United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 191 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921.
193 In his article, Albert Alschuler argues that "quotas" are the only way to end jury
underpresentation. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and theJuiy, 44 DuKE LJ. 704,
706 (1995).
194
See supraPart I1. See also Munsterman, supra note 3, at 74 ("With the understandable frustration of courts which, despite multiple source lists, still do not achieve acceptable
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is greater than 10% Hispanic and sends additional jury questionnaires
to individuals in those designated municipalities. 195 This approach,
however, is insufficient to guarantee that a jury chosen from a fair
cross-section of the community will result. 196 The Eastern District of
Michigan, on the other hand, assesses the racial and ethnic composition of the population and then removes individuals at random from
groups that are overrepresented in the qualified jury pool.' 97 Thus,
the Eastern District of Michigan achieves a qualified jury pool that
represents a perfect cross-section of the community before it sends
jury summonses. 198
Commentators have criticized stratified sampling for practical
reasons. 199 Critics complain that courts will begin by trying to create a
racially and ethnically balanced qualified jury pool, but will ultimately
be tempted to try to create ajury pool based on increasingly narrow
classifications.2 0 0 More problematic, however is the constitutionality
of ajury selection plan that relies on stratified sampling. Courts have
upheld stratified sampling techniques for years as a valid means of
achieving geographically balanced juries, but the constitutionality of
using these techniques to achieve racial and ethnic balance remains
untested.2 0 ' The Third Circuit, in Ramsuer v. Beyer;20 2 criticized the
trial judge's addition of two African-Americans to the jury venire, even
though the judge was not altering the composition of the jury for invidious, racially discriminatory purposes.2 0 3 The Supreme Court has
never specifically addressed the issue.
The constitutionality of an affirmative action program, like stratified sampling, often hinges on the level of scrutiny that a court applies. Supporters of affirmative action in the jury context typically
representation of particular cognizable groups, a stratified selection technique could be
attractive.").
195
U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, Magistrate Judge's Report Pursuant to
Second Restated Plan for Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors Pursuant to Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968-Bridgeport Seat of Court-Nov. 1995, at 3-5 (filed Nov.
9, 1995). Similar reports were prepared for the Hartford and New Haven Divisions.
196 Although this technique increases the likelihood that a jury questionnaire will
reach a minority recipient, there is still no guarantee that the questionnaire will be returned and qualified. This system suffers from the defects discussed in Part III.B. See supra
Part III.B.
197 Eastern District of Michigan, Jury Selection Plan, supra note 4, at 7.
198 Unlike the District of Connecticut's approach, the approach used by the District of
Michigan directly affects the composition of the qualified jury pool after all other influences have been accounted for and immediately before jurors are summoned.
199 See Munsterman, supranote 3, at 76.
200
201

Id.

Id. at 60, 74. For an example of the use of stratified sampling to achieve geographic balance, see U.S. District Court, Western District ofNewYorkJury Plan, supra note
2, at 2.
202 983 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947 (1998).
203 Id. at 1222-25. See also Domitrovich, supra note 30, at 73-74.
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make two arguments for exempting their initiatives from strict scrutiny: (1) race-conscious selection practices are not objectionable, because they "include," rather than "exclude" individuals, and (2) these
practices do not deprive any group of an opportunity to which it is
entitled. 20 4 However, in light of recent Supreme Court rulings, it is
unlikely that either argument could save such an affirmative action
initiative from the rigors of strict scrutiny.
The "inclusion"/"exclusion" distinction originated in Cassell v.
Texas,20 5 the only Supreme Court case to consider an equal protection
challenge to an affirmative action program in the jury context. 20 6 Proponents of the distinction focus on Justice Frankfurter's statement
that "purposeful, systematic non-inclusion because of color" violates
the Equal Protection Clause, and argue by implication that the Court
would not find race-conscious programs unconstitutional when the ultimate objective is "inclusion."20 7 Although this argument may have
been persuasive at one time, 20 8 it is now clear that the Court will apply
strict scrutiny to a race-conscious program regardless of its objectives.
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,2 0 9 the Court applied strict
scrutiny to a minority set-aside program, despite the program's intended objective of remedying the effects of past, purposeful discrimination. In rejecting the petitioner's claim for relief, the Court noted
that "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry... there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions." 2 10 More
recently, the Court reiterated its race-blind approach to affirmative
action in Shaw v. Reno.2 11 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
stated that regardless of the motivation behind them, racial classifications "are by their very nature odious" and must be "narrowly tailored
to further a compelling governmental interest."212 The Court
204

NancyJ. King, RacialJurymanderingrCanceror Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirm-

ative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. 1 Ev. 707, 730 (1993).
339 U.S. 282 (1950).
King, supra note 204, at 780.
207
Casse4 339 U.S. at 291 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
208 See Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding the jury commissioner's decision to include two African-Americans on a list of prospective grand jurors and
noting that "[u]nlike the other cases heard en banc, this one does not challenge the exclusion of Negroes from grand or trial juries. Rather, this case ... complains of purposeful
inclusion."), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967); United States v. Jenison, 485 F. Supp. 655,
666 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (noting that "[ilt is well recognized that purposeful inclusion of distinct classes on grand or petit juries does not constitute discrimination violative of the
federal constitution").
209
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
210 Id. at 493.
211
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
212 Id. at 643.
205

206
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reached a similar conclusion in Miller v. Johnson,21 3 another redistricting case decided last term.
The Court's reasoning in Shaw also suggests that the Court could
not be persuaded to refrain from applying strict scrutiny, even if a
petitioner succeeded in convincing the Court that a system of racial
quotas would not have a discernible, detrimental effect on any group's
rights to participate in the jury process. In Shaw, the Court ignored
the petitioners' failure to allege that redistricting deprived them of
their right to participate in the political process, and instead concentrated its inquiry on harms that inevitably accompany any racial classification. 214 The Court's reasoning in Shaw went even further. Citing
Powers v. Ohio,215 Justice O'Connor concluded that, "racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or
benefit the races equally."21 6 Thus, given the current state of the law,
neither an objective of "inclusion," nor the lack of a discernible, detrimental effect will shield an affirmative action program from strict
scrutiny.
To some commentators, it seems quite clear that a jury selection
system like the Eastern District of Michigan's would not survive a challenge under the strict scrutiny standard. 2 17 For instance, before any

of the recent Supreme Court cases were even decided, Munsterman
and Munsterman noted that "[w]hile stratified selection solves the

representation problem by an affirmative compensation, the resultant
unequal probability of selection remains to be tested in the courts. In
fact, it can be argued that this affirmative compensation is contrary to
the concept of blind selection."21 8 Given the Supreme Court's current race-blind approach, the additional burden created by the need

for more frequent jury service by members of minority groups would
almost certainly rise to the level of a cognizable harm for the Court.
Thus, the Court finds itself in a "catch-22." To be true to its race-blind
approach, the Court must invalidate stratified sampling. But, the

Court must uphold the practice if it wants to protect a criminal defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION

To obtain juries that represent a fair cross-section of the community, courts strive to compose the most representative source list possi213
214

215

115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490-91 (1995).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50.
499 U.S. 400 (1991).

Shaw, 509 U.S. at 651.
See, e.g., King, supra note 204, at 730 (explaining that the Supreme Court has "made
it clear that it will apply the most exacting scrutiny to all state-initiated racial classifications,
regardless of their alleged purpose or effect").
218
Munsterman, supra note 3, at 76.
216
217
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ble. However, given the failure of using multiple source lists to
remedy the problem of minority underrepresentation and the additional costs associated with supplementation, courts should explore
alternative means of increasing minority representation in the jury selection process. Although modifying the jury questionnaire would not
add minorities to the jury source pool, it would, at least, allow courts
to more accurately evaluate the problem. A Supreme Court decision
specifying a standard and numeric cutoff by which to evaluate minority underrepresentation would also help. Requiring courts to wait
before they begin selecting juries from a new qualified pool, and setting a minimum on the number of individuals that the pool must contain, would guarantee that the pool is equally representative for all
defendants. But, in the end, if the ultimate objective is to choose juries from a pool that is a "fair cross section of the community," the
most efficient and effective means of reaching the goal is to use a
stratified sampling approach like the Eastern District of Michigan's
approach. Some constitutional justification for this approach must be
found if the Fifth and Sixth Amendments' guarantees are going to
survive the Supreme Court's current race-blind jurisprudence.
John P. Bueker

